What Does CATL Have Left When Car Manufacturers Develop Their Own Batteries?

Author | Hao Wen

Editor | Qujie Business News Group

In this round of car manufacturers developing batteries in-house, what might be rewritten is not just the supplier list, but also CATL's profit model relying on a complete battery system to obtain premiums.

On the evening of September 18, after the Xpeng G9L launch event, Xpeng founder He Xiaopeng stated in response to media inquiries about whether they would develop batteries in-house, "Starting this year, Xpeng will handle batteries entirely in-house;" previously, Li Auto also announced that self-developed batteries will gradually cover all models.

Car manufacturers' accelerated commitment to developing batteries quickly formed a response in the capital market. On September 18, CATL's A-share closed at 301.95 yuan/share, a drop of more than 35% from the year's high of 467.34 yuan on May 7. The HK share closed at 507 HKD/share, a new intraday low since March 10. The total market capitalization of A+H shares evaporated by more than 700 billion yuan from the peak.

Image Source: Baidu Screenshot

The market generally views car manufacturers developing batteries in-house as two things: saving costs and ensuring supply. But the changes happening in the industry are far more than just replacing suppliers. Car manufacturers are seeking to regain product definition rights over batteries. CATL's past profit path relying on complete battery system solutions to obtain premiums is being impacted, and the original business model is facing structural adjustments.

1. Definition Rights Shift Down, Manufacturing Rights Remain Central

First, clearly see what car manufacturers are actually doing. They are not fully building battery cell factories themselves, but are keeping product definition rights such as battery formulas, fast-charging logic, BMS strategies, and vehicle integration standards in their own hands, while handing over the battery cell manufacturing process to battery suppliers.

For example, Xiaomi's "Longjia Battery" involves Xiaomi responsible for product definition and battery pack design and development, with CALB and Sunwoda customizing battery cells according to Xiaomi standards; Li Auto's battery self-research involves self-developed and self-made battery packs, with cells produced by Sunwoda and CALB; Xpeng has taken back the entire battery pack chain, retaining only the procurement of battery cells.

This exactly hits CATL's core source of high gross margins. In the past, it delivered a complete set of "battery solutions + exclusive designated supply", obtaining technology, system solutions, and pricing dividends from exclusive supply in one order. Nowadays, car manufacturers hold formulas, structures, vehicle integration, and other links in their own hands, only purchasing customized battery cells from battery manufacturers. CATL's business space for obtaining premiums relying on complete battery packs is facing obvious squeezing.

Changes are also reflected in financial report data. In the first half of 2026, CATL's largest revenue source - power battery system gross margin dropped to 20.63%, a year-on-year decline of 1.78 percentage points.

Image Source: Semi-Annual Report Screenshot

The rising logic of second-tier battery factories has also become clear. In addition to their own technology iterations, the key lies in being willing to adapt to car manufacturers' product definitions and undertake deep customization development. Li Auto injected 2.65 billion yuan to increase capital in Sunwoda, becoming its second-largest shareholder. CALB has also grown into Xpeng's main supplier. Under the current industry chain pattern, manufacturers capable of implementing car manufacturer customized battery cell solutions are expected to capture the incremental share released by CATL.

2. "Know How to Build Cars, Not Necessarily How to Build Batteries"

Car manufacturers regaining definition rights is essentially a redistribution of profits.

In the past few years, profits in the new energy vehicle industry chain have concentrated heavily on the battery segment. In the first half of 2026, CATL's net profit attributable to parent company was 43.284 billion yuan, while according to statistics, the combined net profit of 15 mainstream listed car manufacturers such as BYD, SAIC, Geely, Chery, etc., was 21.048 billion yuan, less than half of CATL alone. As early as 2022, GAC Group's then Chairman Zeng Qinghong openly complained: "Batteries account for 60% of the vehicle cost, aren't I just working for CATL?"

Image Source: Semi-Annual Report Screenshot

In this round, car manufacturers developing batteries in-house combined with multiple suppliers running in parallel, the goal is to squeeze excess profits in the battery segment and promote profits to flow back to the vehicle end. The lithium battery industry may return from past phased high returns to a relatively fair profit level of manufacturing.

But inferring "CATL will be replaced" based on this is still premature. Car manufacturers' battery self-research has a natural ceiling. He Xiaopeng explicitly stated in an interview that Xpeng does not intend to enter the production of battery cells itself; investing in battery cells is ultimately for others.

Car manufacturers are good at vehicle product definition and system integration, but face high thresholds in yield, consistency, and cost control of mass production of battery cells; battery cell manufacturing belongs to capital-intensive industries, only sufficient scale can dilute costs. Once sales fluctuate, capital-intensive capacity will drag down the car manufacturer's balance sheet. CATL's Chief Manufacturing Officer Ni Jun once openly stated: "Knowing how to build cars doesn't mean knowing how to build batteries, professionals should do professional things."

Definition rights can be contested, but barriers to mass production are difficult to migrate quickly. In the first half of this year, CATL's battery system capacity utilization rate reached 94.86%, with 764 GWh of capacity under construction; the German plant has already achieved profitability, and bases in Hungary, Spain, and Indonesia are landing successively. According to data released by Korean market research firm SNE Research, from January to May 2026, CATL's global power battery market share broke through 40% for the first time, reaching 40.2%.

Image Source: Semi-Annual Report Screenshot

CATL has even started to fight back for definition rights. It launched the 75# standardized battery swapping block for heavy trucks, laid out passenger car integrated smart chassis, packaged "battery + chassis" into a standardized solution that vehicle manufacturers can procure, trying to turn itself back into the "person who sets standards". On high-end models above 300,000 yuan, Qilin and Shenxing supercharging remain the mainstream technical solutions in terms of performance and safety. Although car manufacturers generally introduce second and third suppliers and carry out diversified supply chain layouts, for main-selling high-end flagship models, most will still keep CATL in the supplier list.

Therefore, the industry is unlikely to move towards simple substitution. In the domestic power battery track, a two-way check and balance pattern is more likely to form: car manufacturers strive for product definition rights, promoting more industry chain profits to flow back to the vehicle end; CATL guards the core capabilities of high-end manufacturing.

However, challenges still objectively exist. If more high-end models deeply dominate battery definitions later, the product performance advantages of leading battery enterprises gradually turn into industry general capabilities, and CATL's existing product premiums still have the possibility of being continuously compressed.

Facing the gaming pressure of the domestic market, CATL has not bet all its chips on domestic car manufacturers' power battery businesses. Overseas markets and energy storage businesses have become important growth pillars. In the first half of the year, the energy storage business achieved revenue of 53.261 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 87.54%; overseas revenue was 87.129 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 42.35%, with overseas business gross margin at 29.97%, significantly higher than the domestic business's 21.16%.

For CATL, the real risk does not lie in being completely replaced by car manufacturers, but in whether it can adapt to the gross margin in the domestic market that is tending to thin out, relying on manufacturing advantages, global layout, and energy storage business to continuously obtain reasonable returns.