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Editor's Note: The tuition fee for transformation has already been paid; Changan calls this move "Highland Pace Adjustment"; whether the market is willing to wait for its acceleration in the second half depends on the pedal pressure of the Q06 entering the race, whether it is really more responsive than the PPT.
In late July, Changan Automobile released two key signals in succession: on one hand, the semi-annual performance forecast disclosed in mid-July — vehicle sales in the first half were 1.1189 million (down 17.44% year-on-year), net profit attributable to the parent company was only 740 million to 970 million yuan (down 57.66%—67.70% year-on-year), and deducting non-recurring net profit was 230 million to 330 million yuan (down 77.65%—84.42% year-on-year);
On the other hand, on July 23, an announcement of 5.267 billion yuan private placement was approved by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, funds will be invested in new energy models and digital intelligence platforms (4.217 billion yuan) and the global R&D center (1.05 billion yuan).
In this contrast of cold and heat, this central state-owned enterprise (SOE) auto company, approaching the 3 million vehicle level in annual sales, is actively removing the "scale halo". At the mid-year media communication meeting, Tan Benhong, deputy secretary of the Party Committee and director of Changan Automobile Group, stated this contrast very frankly: "In the first half of the year, the group proactively cut off low-margin inefficient products, no longer solely pursuing scale increments without profit." He used a marathon metaphor — "Running a marathon at high altitude, the pace for the first 5 kilometers and the last 5 kilometers must be different; blind acceleration will only deplete strength."
"Discarding" 70,000 vehicles: Not that they can't be sold, but don't want to sell them
At least one part of Changan's decline this round was cut by their own hand.
In April this year, the "1445" global strategy was implemented, compressing the product series from 63 models to 36 models. The most eye-catching move was halting production of Lumin — a micro electric car priced below 50,000 yuan, which was the volume leader last year, accounting for an empty gap of about 70,000 units in the first half alone. "The profit margin for low-end micro electric vehicles is extremely narrow, and enterprises no longer solely pursue scale increments without profit." Tan Benhong did not beat around the bush at the communication meeting: "After halting Lumin, the average price and profit margin of the new energy sector actually rose; excluding the reduction from Lumin, Changan's new energy sales actually grew 11.2% year-on-year in the first half."
China Auto Network consulted an insider close to Changan's internal team, who calculated a bill of account: "Lumin's peak monthly sales exceeded 10,000, but the gross profit per vehicle hovered for a long time between a few hundred yuan to a little over a thousand. Including channel rebates and capital occupation, sometimes selling one vehicle results in a loss. Rather than using it to rush the ranking list, it is better to give the production line to new energy like Qiyuan Q05 and Deepal S05 that can run through the gross profit." In his view, cutting Lumin is not admitting defeat, it is "exchanging ineffective scale for effective R&D bandwidth".
But proactively losing weight cannot explain everything. The fuel base is retreating even faster: CS75 fuel version fell more than 37% year-on-year in the first half, Eado relied on terminal price cuts to hold market share, CS55, UNI-T/K and other old SUVs weakened环比。New energy sales were 414,200 vehicles, a year-on-year decline of 8.3%, Qiyuan Q05 (about 72,000) and Deepal S05 (about 79,000) held up the market, Avatr sold only 27,600 vehicles in the first half, nearly halved year-on-year, cumulative losses over four years exceeded 13 billion yuan. Tan Benhong also admitted: "We have not yet fully mastered the operating ability of multiple brands."
External squeezing is equally real. The company attributes the primary cause of profit shrinkage to exchange rate losses + raw material price hikes: Overseas sales in the first half were 454,700 vehicles, up 51.87% year-on-year, overseas accounted for about 33.6% of the total; a slight fluctuation in exchange rates causes profit bleeding; lithium carbonate prices rebounded to 180,000 yuan/ton, storage chip unit prices jumped several times, the industry average profit margin was squeezed to around 3.4%. Securities Auto Analyst Li Qiang believes: "Changan's 'decline' is active + passive twisted together, but the active part accounts for a higher proportion than the market thinks — it chooses to step on the brakes at the 3 million vehicle high point itself, rather than waiting until the bottom of the slope to brake."
Betting on self-developed intelligent driving, refusing to be an "assembly plant"
Where money goes explains the problem better than the money itself.
This private placement was fully covered by cash from the controlling shareholder; even if the stock price was below the issuance price, it still locked for three years, and the market generally interpreted it as "Central SOE major shareholder backing confidence". The fundraising does not expand capacity, only invests in R&D: 4.217 billion yuan into new energy models and digital intelligence platforms, 1.05 billion yuan into the global R&D center. Corresponding to Changan's past five years of intelligent accumulation input exceeding 10 billion, team exceeding 7,500 people, 2026 single computing center smashing about 3 billion yuan rhythm.
Intelligent driving is the core landing point of this money. Tan Benhong threw a sharp judgment at the communication meeting: "If automakers give up intelligent driving self-research and only rely on external supply, essentially they are only retaining an assembly factory with a car chassis, without core technology barriers." He calls himself a "heavy intelligent driving user", driving Avatr 90% scenarios with intelligent driving, but emphasized Changan does not choose an aggressive route, "Focus core energy on raising the safety ceiling and polishing the experience".
The landing carrier is the "Tianshu Pilot" system — one-step end-to-end + multimodal large model, scheduled to go into mass production in Qiyuan Q06 this September. Executive Vice President Yang Dayong defined Q06 as the flagship of "Qiyuan fighting for intelligent driving in the second half of the year": "Tianshu Pilot Ultra is not piling on functions, but realizing Changan's digital intelligence promise to mainstream family users." And the "one brain, multiple bodies" in Tan Benhong's mouth is using the intelligent driving large model as the "brain", to radiate to robots, low-altitude travel and other "bodies", Changan Tianshu Intelligent Robot subsidiary is already on the table.
Forcing this logic to ask a new power intelligent driving director, he replied restrainedly: "If 7,500 people are intelligent driving + cockpit + tri-electric packed, single track concentration is not as good as Huawei Car BU (7,000—8,000 people full-time intelligent driving), XPeng (about 3,000 people intelligent driving team + 10 billion R&D). Changan's advantage is the whole vehicle sales base and central SOE financing channel, the disadvantage is C-end users have not yet established mindshare like 'XNGP' 'ADS' for 'Tianshu'. Whether Q06 can fight, depends on national availability and takeover rate, not the press conference PPT."
Organization side is also consolidating: Deepal and Avatr mid-to-back coordination, goal 1.5 million vehicle level mid-to-high-end cluster, cost reduction 20%—30%; four vice presidents focus on overseas, Thailand base has already scaled up production, Tan Benhong put a word "Future domestic and overseas 50/50 split". These actions short-term save no profit, but past "many children good fight" scattered shipping towards "zone complement" gather.
Changan's dual decline in volume and profit in the first half of 2026 is not a collapse narrative, but a central SOE at the 3 million vehicle level in "fuel retreat faster than new energy handover, low-end scale yielding to gross margin quality, intelligent driving heavy investment not yet at realization period" three cracks opened at the same time's active slow driving.
Tan Benhong cut off the 70,000 units of Lumin, exchanging for the bottom line of not using ineffective scale to dress up the financial statements; 5.267 billion private placement passed, exchanging for Tianshu intelligent driving and digital intelligence platform to run for 18 months of ammunition.
The three variables really to watch in the second half are very specific — Qiyuan Q06 Tianshu Pilot real takeover performance after mass production, whether Deepal/Qiyuan/Avatr three-brand internal consumption really reduced, whether overseas 450,000 vehicle sales base can offset the exchange rate backlash.
The tuition fee for transformation has already been paid, Changan calls this move "Highland Pace Adjustment"; whether the market is willing to wait for its acceleration in the second half depends on the pedal pressure of the Q06 entering the race, whether it is really more responsive than the PPT.
