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Author | Klein
Produced by | Road Coffee in
Summary: The risk of a late mover lies in the market not necessarily giving you another chance.
Ora, the former pure electric vehicle brand, has been selling gasoline cars for several months now.
March 12, 2026, Ora held the Ora 5 Series Global Multi-Power Launch Event in Thailand, showcasing Hybrid, Pure Electric, and Fuel powertrains simultaneously for the first time, and re-establishing the brand positioning as the "Global Fashionable Boutique Automotive Brand".
April 25, 2026, during the Beijing Auto Show, Ora officially launched the Ora 5 SUV Fuel Version and Hybrid Version. From this moment on, Ora was no longer a pure electric/New Energy vehicle brand.
In the Chinese automotive market, brands that start with pure electric and then expand to plug-in hybrid are numerous, such as XPeng, Zeekr; but with the "birth certificate" of a pure electric brand, turning back to build gasoline cars directly, Ora is the only one, even expanding its sights to the global market, which is also the only one.
The extent of Ora's strategic wavering is quite confusing, which is also a microcosm of Great Wall Motor's transformation. It created a pure electric brand as early as 2018, once became a market leader, and even started laying out battery cells in 2012, successfully incubating an industry-leading power battery company (SVOLT) within its own system, but Great Wall Motor's electrification transformation has remained lackluster.
Why is it so "bizarre"?
The "contradictory" Ora
To be honest, I was initially attracted by Ora's suddenly rebounding sales volume, but after careful research, I found that this is actually a "Gasoline Revival" play.
For the first three months of this year, Ora's monthly sales were still in a continuous decline, averaging around 2,000 units per month, but sales volume rebounded rapidly starting from April. June saw a smooth breakthrough of 10,000 units, and excellent monthly sales performance over 10,000 units was maintained in the following months. January-September, Ora's cumulative sales reached 59,400 units, doubling year-on-year, already exceeding last year's full-year sales (48,300 units).
There are two reasons for the rebound starting in April, first, the Ora 5 SUV Fuel Version launched on April 25, second, Ora's export volume grew rapidly starting from April, and the Fuel Version itself is one of the main export forces.
Starting from May, the wholesale volume of Ora 5 SUV Fuel Version accounted for over 30% of the brand's total sales volume, peaking at over 45%; while starting from June, Ora's monthly export volume accounted for over 55% of the monthly sales volume, with the highest moment approaching 65%. Among them, the Ora 5 SUV Fuel Version and Pure Electric Version were the two main export forces, each accounting for over 40%.
If we exclude the sales volume of the Fuel Version, Ora's cumulative sales volume for the first 9 months of this year was approximately 38,000 units, still maintaining a 27.6% year-on-year growth; if we exclude export volume, Ora's domestic cumulative sales volume for 9 months was about 28,900 units, flat compared to the same period last year; that is to say, if the Fuel Car and Export sales volumes are removed simultaneously, Ora's New Energy Vehicle market in China is still declining.
With such performance, it is hard to say whether the Ora "starting anew" has truly opened up a new situation. From a sales volume perspective, the overall scale of Ora has shown significant improvement, which is naturally good news; but from a transformation perspective, the New Energy brand recognition accumulated by this brand is constantly blurring.
A Transformation Road with Multiple Turns
Reviewing Ora's transformation road can be described as having multiple twists and turns.
In 2018, the Ora brand was born, entering the pure electric market with A00 class microcars such as Black Cat, White Cat. It precisely hit the route of high cost-performance commuting cars, rapidly achieved success. In 2021, sales volume reached 135,000 units, increasing 140% year-on-year, overwhelming Nio, XPeng, and Li Auto.
In 2022, due to the skyrocketing prices of power battery raw materials such as Lithium Carbonate, combined with chip shortages, the cost of pure electric vehicles surged, worsening corporate losses. Great Wall resolutely cut the Black Cat and White Cat series in February of that year, instead betting on higher positioning models.
Pity, due to insufficient product competitiveness, models with higher positioning such as Ballet Cat, Flash Cat failed to open up the situation.
At the same time, due to Great Wall Motor Chairman Wei Jianjun always believing that the pure electric vehicle business model itself has problems, it is difficult to achieve profitability, so after 2022, no resources were continuously invested in the Ora brand, causing Ora to begin declining, with sales volume dropping throughout 2023-2025.
Eighth years after brand birth, Ora's brand positioning has always been wavering. The starting point in 2018-early 2021 was "Urban Electric Mini Car". In March 2021, it announced to be the "Automotive Brand That Loves Women the Most". In October 2022, it claimed "For Both Men and Women". In April 2023, it swung back to "ALL IN on the Female Track". In June 2025, it shouted "Broader Youth" proposition, until March 2026 it determined "Global Fashionable Boutique Automotive Brand".
Changing brand positioning when it doesn't sell makes consumers always unable to remember who Ora is, and this time jumping directly to the Fuel Vehicle field makes it even harder for outsiders to understand Ora.
Strong Restraints of Profit Priority
Ora and the overall transformation dilemma of Great Wall Motor essentially come from its profit-oriented management philosophy. Wei Jianjun has emphasized multiple times that Chinese Electric Vehicles have no original advantages in core technologies such as batteries, motors, electronic controls, only industry chain advantages. Moreover, pure electric cars suffer serious losses and rely too much on capital infusion; he prefers diverse technology routes.
So besides pure electric, Great Wall Motor clearly plans more in Plug-in Hybrid. Haval, Wey, Tank, and Pickup brands all have Plug-in Hybrid models. Wey models on sale are switched entirely to Plug-in Hybrid models, becoming a "New Energy Vehicle Brand" more pure than Ora.
However, stemming from its profit-oriented concept, Great Wall's Plug-in Hybrid layout is also "unique". The most mainstream Haval brand has the lowest proportion. January-September New Energy penetration rate was only around 16%. Tank brand penetration rate is about 51%, while Wey is 100%.
Compared to mainstream industry solutions, Great Wall's Plug-in Hybrid layout presents a clear "High-End Priority" pattern, on Haval brand, the slogan "New Energy Only for Four-Wheel Drive" was shouted. This means even if Plug-in Hybrid is laid out in Haval brand, it will only appear on high-spec versions.
The reason for focusing on high-end models stems from the enterprise's profit-oriented concept. In terms of technical solutions, it is the higher-cost Hi4 series technology. This technical solution is more complex but has stronger versatility. It can meet daily use needs as well as hardcore off-road scenario requirements. Especially on off-road tracks with stronger performance requirements, this solution has unique advantages, allowing Great Wall to maintain leadership in the New Energy Hardcore Off-Road field.
However, conversely, because technical costs are relatively higher, only high-end models can support its integration, in the wider field of essential two-wheel drive city SUVs, this technology shows a side of "maladjustment". This is also the reason why Haval emphasizes carrying this technology only on four-wheel drive models.
This is equivalent to Haval directly abandoning the low-end Plug-in Hybrid SUV market, which will long-term affect its New Energy Vehicle penetration rate and subsequent scale, after all, the continuous contraction of gasoline cars has become an unavoidable trend. And since Haval remains the brand with the highest proportion in Great Wall, this will also make Great Wall's overall New Energy Vehicle penetration rate difficult to improve. Currently its penetration rate is around 28%, significantly lower than the market average.
Great Wall's Transformation Dilemma
Observing Great Wall's entire transformation history, this enterprise shows a very "stubborn" side: because the pure electric vehicle profitability path is not clear, it resolutely cuts hot-selling models at its peak; it has a power battery company within its system with cost advantages, but it would rather launch new gasoline cars than bet during the pure electric market explosion; knowing that the P1+P3+ Single-Geared DHT Plug-in Hybrid configuration is the simplest and most adapted for essential city SUV models, but insisting on multi-geared solutions without compromising to the market...
If one says Great Wall does not care about electrification transformation, but it has chewed the hard bone of independently developed and produced power batteries, and tolerated its long-term losses (of course, this may be related to SVOLT not being within Great Wall Motor's listed company system); if one says it cares about transformation, it has long been unwilling to "forward-looking" invest.
All of this can indeed be explained by Great Wall's profit-oriented management philosophy, but an inescapable fact is that to this day, Great Wall's transformation dilemma has shifted from a strategic willingness problem to a capability reserve problem.
In intelligent driving, the independently developed Himile essentially stalled in November 2025. Great Wall turned to Yuanrong Qixing, ZhuoYu, and Momenta, three external purchases spliced together. A company that insists on independently developing engines, transmissions, and batteries, only abandoning independent development on the "Soul".
On the pure electric vehicle side, SVOLT's Supercharging Battery is world-class level, but Ora 5 Pure Electric Version is still 400V platform, 30%–80% charging about 20 minutes, Great Wall still does not have a mass-produced 800V pure electric car, nor any self-built charging network.
Financially, the bills are also starting to mature. 2025 Deducted Non-Net Profit was 6.059 billion yuan, year-on-year -37.76%. First half of 2026 was 1.61 billion yuan, year-on-year -55.04%. Single vehicle net profit dropped from about 10,300 yuan in 2024 to about 4,300 yuan; Selling expenses surged 44% in 2025. Holding the existing market requires spending more and more money.
During the chaotic period of market involution, strategically avoiding involution and focusing on high-profit models is a viable strategy, but the risk of being a late mover always lies in the market not necessarily giving you a chance to act.
