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Written by | Wang Jing
Edited by | Huang Dalu
Designed by | Zhen Youmei
Another cross-border player buying a shell to make cars brings new news.
On July 11, Chunan Automobile completed the rollout of the first ET engineering prototype car. Its helmsman Dai Deming is both the head of Hengxin Auto Group, the fourth largest dealer group in the country, and the operator of Chunan New Energy, one of the top five global energy storage battery shippers. Chunan Automobile's manufacturing qualification comes from taking over the WM Motor Huanggang factory. (See Automotive Commercial Review's previous report "Exclusive | After He Xiaopeng and Lei Jun, Hubei Veteran Enters the Red Sea of Car Manufacturing")
Buying a shell to get qualifications is nothing new. In Putian, Fujian, a company walked for ten years, first called Yundou, later JoyAir. After two rounds of shareholder changes, it now only has a qualification document and a silent factory.
As new cross-border players enter the arena, this ten-year story is worth telling from the beginning.
Former Mixed-Ownership Reform Model
On December 11, 2015, in Xiuyu District, Putian, the Yundou New Energy establishment ceremony.
Red banners hung high above the temporary stage, representatives of four shareholders took the stage one by one—Fujian Automotive Group 39%, Putian State-owned Investment 34.44%, listed company Haiyuan Composites 11%, and the management team centered on founder Liu Xinwen 15.56%, contributing a total of 900 million yuan.
State-owned capital provided policy and land, private capital provided efficiency, management provided industry experience. Some media reported at the time it was called a "Perfect Model": having state-owned capital backing, yet combining market vitality.
Liu Xinwen came with real skills. He entered Chery Automobile in 1998, working his way up from a grassroots engineer to General Manager of Chery New Energy, personally making Chery QQ3 EV and Chery eQ—the latter sold 25,000 units in 2015, accounting for 12% of the pure electric market.
He recruited Lin Mi from BYD DENZA. This young man who became DENZA Vice President at 32 served as Executive Vice President and General Manager of Marketing of Yundou. The vehicle technology was managed by Chery veteran Chen Zihuang, who has 20 years of vehicle development experience; the addition of three-electric expert Liu Yan filled the core weakness. She led the team to develop the BMS system, which can maintain 90% range at minus 20 degrees Celsius.
The R&D team started with 200 people, the Putian base was built to an annual capacity of 50,000 units, with a total investment of nearly 1.9 billion yuan, planned according to "Industry 4.0" standards.
What is worth remembering is that 2015, when Yundou was established, was almost the common starting point for a generation of new car forces. NIO was established at the end of 2014, XPeng launched in 2014, Li Auto was founded in July 2015, Leapmotor was registered in December of the same year—they all stood on the same starting line.
But at that time, NIO still relied on JAC for OEM, XPeng R&D was fewer than 50 people, Li Auto was still researching the micro mobility car SEV. Yundou's starting conditions were considered superior among new forces at the same period.
The more crucial chip was qualifications. In January 2017, Yundou obtained the NDRC's new pure electric passenger vehicle qualification, becoming the 10th in the country; in July, it obtained MIIT access, becoming one of the first batch of "Dual Qualification" automakers. This was one year earlier than Leapmotor and two years earlier than NIO's mass production.
At that time, registered car companies once approached 500, PPT car manufacturing was prevalent, and those who could list and deliver were few. "Dual Qualification + Current Stock" was the hardest entry pass.
An 80,000 yuan car sold fewer than 9,000 units
On October 10, 2017, at the Xiamen International Convention and Exhibition Center, π1 was officially launched.
Liu Xinwen stood on the stage wearing a dark suit, wearing Yundou's blue Logo on his chest, and said a sentence that colleagues would remember: "We are the fastest new force to achieve mass production and delivery. No PPT, no concept car. Today it launches, tomorrow you can pick up the car."
π1 is equipped with a 38.5kWh ternary lithium battery, NEDC range 251km, maximum power 55kW, peak torque 170N·m, priced at about 80,000 yuan after subsidy. In the year of PPT car manufacturing prevalence, the two words "Current Stock" were the biggest trust endorsement.
Quanzhou dealer Boss Zhang remembered the grand scene at that time: "The store was only 50 square meters, crowded every day, receiving a maximum of 37 orders in one day. A customer drove three hours from Longyan, looked at it on the spot and swiped the card, saying 'No need to wait for the car, there is still government subsidy, it is reassuring'."
In the first month after launch, π1 sales broke through 1,200 units.
In March 2018, π3 followed up, positioned at A0+ pure electric SUV, range 310km, priced at 109,800 to 149,800 yuan, forming a product matrix with π1.
Lin Mi led the "Hundred Cities Thousand Stores" plan, betting heavily on third and fourth-tier cities. These places are price-sensitive and subsidies are tilted. π1 relied on the combination of "80,000 yuan after subsidy + Current Stock" to become the first pure electric car for many families. By the end of the year, dealerships expanded to 103, covering 28 provinces, with third and fourth-tier cities accounting for 70%.
"We do not compete with NIO for the rich in first-tier cities, nor do we compete with Chery for the low-end market of 50,000 to 60,000 yuan. We just do 'Good Cars that People Can Afford'." Lin Mi said at the 2018 marketing conference.
The annual delivery was about 9,000 units, second among new forces, second only to NIO's 11,348 units. But a car selling for 80,000 yuan after subsidy, selling fewer than 9,000 units in a year, itself indicates a problem.
Yundou's "Second Place" is picking a general among dwarfs—new forces were extremely small in volume at that time, rankings did not mean anything. 9,000 units was not the starting point, it was the limit this hand of cards could play in the window period.
200 million yuan turned into 50 million yuan
In the fourth quarter of 2018, the real fork in the road arrived.
Liu Xinwen submitted π7 model R&D budget: 200 million yuan. Plan to build a pure electric exclusive platform, do dual motor four-wheel drive, push the range over 500km, while building a battery Pack factory in Putian at the same time—then batteries were all purchased externally from CATL, procurement cost accounted for 35% of the whole vehicle, autonomous production was expected to reduce costs by 10% to 15%.
His judgment was clear: not building technical barriers is waiting to die.
Fujian Automotive Group's board representative rejected it on the spot: "π1 and π3 are selling well, we should take the opportunity to expand capacity, not put money into R&D where returns are not visible."
The four shareholders had their own calculations.
Fujian Automotive Group required 2019 production capacity utilization to reach 80%, i.e., 40,000 units, opposing long-term R&D investment. Putian State-owned Investment focused on short-term performance, disliked π7 "Three years to break even", better to expand existing capacity directly. Haiyuan Composites didn't even need to talk, in the second half of 2018 they announced plans to reduce Yundou 5% equity, wanting to cash out and exit, this action directly scuttled the originally agreed 500 million yuan Series B financing.
Management team holds 15.56% equity, no veto power in the board.
200 million yuan was finally approved at 50 million yuan, only enough for basic design. Lin Mi's proposed 100 million marketing plan was compressed to 30 million yuan, of which 15 million yuan was still Putian State-owned Investment's local advertising subsidy, designated to be invested in Putian locally, to promote "Made in Putian" city card. Battery Pack factory was not built, three-electric R&D team cut from 50 people to 15 people, core technical personnel began to flow out.
A core technical personnel later recalled: "Like a high-speed car suddenly braked. We knew the opponents were doing intelligence, long range, but shareholders only looked at the present."
偏偏同年 6 月，补贴退坡的刀落下来。四部委联合发文，续航低于 250km 的车型不再享受补贴。π1 续航 251km，刚刚踩线，单车补贴从 3.6 万元腰斩到 1.8 万元；π3 从 4.5 万元降到 2.25 万元。
偏偏 on the same year June, the knife of subsidy rollback fell. Four ministries issued a joint document, models with range lower than 250km no longer enjoy subsidies. π1 range 251km, just stepped on the line, single car subsidy halved from 36,000 yuan to 18,000 yuan; π3 dropped from 45,000 yuan to 22,500 yuan.
Two knives fell at the same time: internal R&D rejected, external competition accelerating.
Boss Zhang calculated: "After subsidy rollback, π1 profit per vehicle dropped from 8,000 yuan to 2,000 yuan, not profitable at all. Chery Small Ant dealers' profit could still reach 5,000 yuan, BYD Yuan EV also had 3,000 yuan, we simply couldn't compete. For a few months I sold cars at a loss just to keep customers, but finally couldn't hold out."
At the end of 2018, 17 of Yundou's 103 dealerships left.
In that year's year-end summary meeting, Liu Xinwen did not propose a clear sales target for the first time, just repeatedly said "Survive".
Dispersed
After Spring Festival 2019, Liu Xinwen resigned. Core team dispersed accordingly. Chen Zihuang went to XPeng, Liu Yan took people to BYD, left a letter on departure: "Yundou had the best starting point, but no correct direction, the value of technical personnel cannot be realized here."
R&D team shrank from 200 people to 80 people, π7 has not been mass-produced to this day.
Fujian Automotive Group's new CEO was from a traditional automaker, lacking new energy industry experience, leading direction was "Cost reduction and efficiency increase"—actual operation was cutting R&D, suppressing marketing, changing to low-price alternative parts.
Quality complaints immediately erupted: in 2019 alone air conditioning failures had 127 cases, involving π1 and π3 two models. A Shandong owner's message was very representative: "Air conditioning cannot adjust temperature, adjustment button simply does not work, air outlet cannot be sealed, now need to wear gloves and hat when driving."
Sales cliff: 2,600 units in 2019, down 72% year-on-year; 1,800 units in 2020.
Four years cumulative loss exceeded 600 million yuan, asset-liability ratio 95%, current liabilities exceeded 1.7 billion yuan, only 80 million yuan left on account, already unable to cover employee wages and supplier payments.
In March 2021, multiple suppliers surrounded factory gates to claim debts, longest arrears reached 18 months.
On the road to collapse, Yundou also wanted to grab a lifebuoy.
In February 2019, Putian Mayor led team to Changchun, Yundou signed formal cooperation agreement with FAW Cars: Both parties planned to jointly develop a pure electric passenger vehicle, FAW provides platform and production manufacturing system, Yundou provides three-electric technology and sales network and qualification, launch by end of year; at the same time cooperate comprehensively in mobility, autonomous driving, supply chain, finance.
If landed, Yundou might turn over relying on FAW's system ability. But this car was never mass-produced—Liu Xinwen had already left, R&D team dispersed, capital chain broke, Yundou could not take on this cooperation. FAW did not really enter, agreement stopped on paper.
In May 2020, Lin Mi returned to serve as CEO again. The first thing he did was abolish rigid systems, "I returned first month abolished attendance, KPI, abolished everything managing people in the enterprise."
He spent one month time to find 200-plus employees of different levels interview, found everyone generally fell into confusion: "Their doubt is, how big can Yundou do? Where to go next for oneself?"
Lin Mi recalled models with air conditioning faults, replaced with qualified parts; old models supplemented with central control big screen and Internet of Vehicles functions; launched old customer trade-in plan, 10,000 yuan subsidy; cooperated with Didi to launch ride-hailing custom version, trying to make up C-end through B-end.
These moves made the enterprise have scattered warm-up, December 2020 monthly sales rose to 320 units. But without new models, without R&D funds, repair cannot save structural collapse.
2021 industry big restructuring accelerated. Saleen bankrupt, Byton stopped, Bojun dissolved. Yundou also fully stopped production, employees shrank from 1,200 to less than 100, dealerships shrank from 103 to 23. Boss Zhang's store also closed in August 2021, ending four-year cooperation.
"Worst time, company account only had 3 million yuan, could not even pay next month wages." A留守 employee recalled.
On June 28, 2022, Junyao Group through its subsidiary Zhuhai Yucheng Investment Center acquired 85.31% equity of Yundou for 450 million yuan. Yundou Dual Qualification shell, waited for Junyao.
Junyao's Wish Calculation
A group doing aviation and milk takes over a car company losing 600 million yuan in four years, fully stopped production, this combination shocked the industry, but Junyao's idea has its logic.
Wang Junjin with his brother Wang Junyao started in 1991 contracting the first private chartered airline route, always wanted to connect sky business to ground. In 1998 obtained Wenzhou 100 taxis permanent operating rights, became Wenzhou's largest taxi operator at the time; in 2010 layout logistics transportation; in 2015 cooperated with Didi to deploy 1,000 new energy ride-hailing vehicles in Shanghai, Hangzhou.
Automotive is just one piece in "JoyAir Big Mobility" ecosystem puzzle, is the missing link in "Home—Car—Cabin" full chain, alongside aviation, milk products, finance. Essentially, Junyao entering automotive industry is sweeping grass hitting rabbits: investment not large, success is ecosystem plus points, failure is stop loss exit.
为此，吉祥汽车走的是低成本造车模式。王均金弟弟王均豪解释得形象：“喝牛奶不一定要养牛，我们不搞重资产自研。”
为此 JoyAir Car followed low-cost car manufacturing model. Wang Junjin's brother Wang Junhao explained vividly: "Drinking milk does not necessarily require raising cows, we do not do heavy asset R&D."
On operation, Junyao used mainly agent model. Former SAIC Group President Chen Zhixin as consultant identity actually controlled decision-making. Daily management handed to Wei Yong. Wei Yong January 2022 from SAIC-GM-Wuling procurement负责人岗位过来，任云度总经理。他重新组建了供应商体系，在莆田扎下根来。
In operation, Junyao used mainly agent model. Former SAIC Group President Chen Zhixin as consultant identity actually controlled decision-making. Daily management handed to Wei Yong. Wei Yong January 2022 from SAIC-GM-Wuling procurement personnel position came over, served as Yundou General Manager. He reorganized supplier system, rooted in Putian.
On November 16, 2023, Junyao Group held "From Rushing to Rushing 2023 JoyAir Big Mobility" Airborne Global Press Conference on JoyAir Aircraft, officially launched "JoyAir Big Mobility" strategy and JoyAir Automobile brand.
However, "Automotive Commercial Review" believes, this operation method made JoyAir Automobile brand from the very beginning have no success opportunity.
Furthermore, when Junyao entered, market environment was already completely different from Yundou start time. 2015 was policy dividend explosion period, competition not full, with qualification and subsidy could sell cars; 2022 was eve of price war, new energy penetration rate approaching 30%, began to enter market driven stage.
In 2023, JoyAir Car (Junyao holding Yundou Car) on old Yundou π1 basis launched Yundus Rabbit: Small pure electric SUV, 69,800 yuan starting, 320km and 415km two versions, mainly 100,000 yuan below market. This naturally impossible to have success possibility.
Actually, JoyAir Car had already discovered this terrible situation early. So, it changed playing method.
In November 2024, JoyAir Car first new car AIR was chosen to be launched in Thailand. There is new energy vehicle relatively competition compared to domestic to be mild, but 159,000 yuan standard version starting sales price, still no one asks about it.
Overseas launch not successful, May 7, 2025, JoyAir AIR model in Beijing launched. This car positioned 150,000 yuan level pure electric sedan, differentiation fully bet on JoyAir Airlines company rights, but relying on plane tickets and gold card cannot fill product power gap.
However, whether in foreign testing or domestic symbolic launch, JoyAir AIR always not successful. And Junyao actually had already early realized this problem. After Thailand launch failure second month, December 2024, Zhuhai Yucheng held equity from 85.31% reduced to 15.55%, Putian State-owned Investment equity from 8.69% increased to 49.44%, Fujian Leading Industry Equity Investment Fund equity from 6% increased to 35%.
From acquisition to exit, two and a half years. For Junyao, this is rational enterprise decision. But for this shell, back to starting point—Ten years, going around and around back to Fujian local state-owned capital hands.
Junyao Group Party Committee Secretary, President Wang Junhao on exit before and after 2025 China Enterprise Competitiveness Annual Conference publicly criticized new car forces: "Now new car forces, many people doing and doing just raise capital, doing and doing just prepare to run."
Indeed, Junyao did not rely on JoyAir Car to raise capital, of course loss also not large. Finally, Wang Junjin personal paid-in 190 million yuan, Group promised three years investment not less than 1 billion yuan, but final arrived less than half.
Whose Net Worth on Table
Yundou and JoyAir story, placed in China new forces ten years restructuring full landscape look, not an exception, is a category.
Put failed list out one by one: Yundou (Liu Xinwen, Chery System), JoyAir (Chen Zhixin + Wei Yong, SAIC/Wuling System), WM Motor (Shen Hui + Hou Haijing, Geely, Volvo/SAIC-GM System), Aiways (Fu Qiang + Chen Zhixin, Volvo/SAIC System), Enovate (Zhang Hailiang, SAIC System), HiPhi (Ding Lei, SAIC System), Neta (Fang Yunzhou + Zhang Yong, Chery/BAIC System), pure traditional automaker born professional managers at helm.
Then look at surviving that few: Li Bin sold Easy Car founded NIO, He Xiaopeng sold UC founded XPeng, Li Xiang sold Autohome founded Li Auto, Zhu Jiangming is Dahua Co-founder, invested 500 million yuan personal funds founded Leapmotor, all wealth free after take own money enter scene.
Difference not only in know or not know new automotive, but also in who bears risk.
Professional manager spends shareholders' money, investors' money, local government's money, do decision naturally has retreat road—worst is also change one company continue to be executive.
And NIO, XPeng, Li Auto, Leapmotor founders, net worth bet on this one thing. Li Bin 2019 almost bankrupt also did not leave, He Xiaopeng repeatedly add personal assets, Zhu Jiangming take own money smash in. "Unsuccessful return to zero" people and "Unsuccessful change place" people, do out decision weight different.
Junyao is third kind variant: Money is own, but mind not all here. Automotive just is ecosystem puzzle piece, use agent operation, one risk just pull back. Funds in place, determination not in place.
Governance structure problem also runs through all. Yundou is four-party system, JoyAir is external shareholders plus consultant plus general manager multi-head pattern, WM Motor has multi-round VC each has demands, Aiways shareholders changed several rounds, Neta then 360 and local government both have voice.
Decision power dispersed, no one willing to bet full on long-term investment. Liu Xinwen held Yundou 15.56% equity, no decision power, R&D budget 200 million yuan cut to 50 million yuan stop not stop.
Putian Xiuyu District sea breeze still blowing. Dual Qualification shell still there, Putian State-owned Investment again become largest shareholder. Ten years, this card from scarce turned into chicken rib—2017 it worth 2 billion yuan entry fee, now 450 million yuan no one willing to pay out again.
