Looking at the financial report, in the first half of this year Leapmotor's net profit was 210 million yuan, spread across 356,000 vehicles, earning less than 600 yuan per car. If the price war continues, this thin profit margin could be worn through at any time.

If you live in Guomao, Beijing or Jing'an, Shanghai, you probably have little impression of Leapmotor Cars. The streets here are filled with Nio battery swap vehicles, Li Auto's family-friendly cars, and Xiaomi's SU7, yet you rarely see that inconspicuous green car logo.
But looking at the sales rankings for September this year, the first place was Leapmotor, delivering 105,000 units in a single month, more than double that of the second place. This marks the third consecutive month selling over 100,000 vehicles. Looking back further, in 2025 Leapmotor sold nearly 600,000 vehicles, taking the top spot among new forces, and also achieved annual profitability—before them, only Li Auto had achieved this among Chinese new forces.
A brand that is nearly "invisible" in Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities became the best surviving player in this round of elimination. What exactly did Leapmotor do right?
01 An Engineer's Disasterous StartLeapmotor's founder, Zhu Jiangming, born in 1967, from Yiwu, is 7 years older than Li Bin and 14 years older than Li Xiang. In an era where new force founders generally talk about sentiment and user operations, he was an outlier—in 1993, he co-founded Dahua Technology with friend Fu Liquan, starting with video surveillance equipment, building this company into the second largest in the global security industry. When he decided to make cars in 2015, he was already 48 years old.
The beginning was catastrophic. The first car Leapmotor launched in 2019, the S01, was a niche two-door coupe, with huge controversy over its design, the market rejected it. At its worst, Leapmotor could only deliver 879 vehicles a month. The company couldn't pay salaries several times, Zhu Jiangming and Fu Liquan had to put their own money in proportion to keep the company alive.
But his engineering background gave him a judgment completely different from others. Zhu Jiangming believed early on that 70% of EV technology lies in electronics and control, "these are blank slates, where latecomers have a full chance to build advantages." He even believed Moore's Law still holds in the automotive industry—battery, motor, and electronic architecture costs would continue to fall, whoever made costs extreme would survive to the end.
02 Crunching the Numbers to the BoneWhen this mindset hit the execution level, it became Leapmotor's most famous "full-domain in-house research".
To this day, Leapmotor's core components accounting for 65% of the total vehicle cost are all self-developed and self-manufactured, triple-electric systems, smart cockpits, intelligent driving algorithms, even audio systems are not spared. Zhu Jiangming calculated a figure: making audio systems themselves saves 100 to 200 yuan per vehicle compared to procurement from suppliers. Saving 100-200 per vehicle on hundreds of thousands of vehicles a year equals tens of millions in profit.
Another calculation is platformization. Leapmotor's C10, C11, and C16 models come from the same platform, parts sharing rate is over 80%, with the B series models even reaching 88%. The higher the parts commonality, the larger the procurement scale, the thinner the mold amortization, and the lower the cost—this is the most basic business wisdom of the Yiwu Small Commodity Market, brought by Zhu Jiangming unchanged into the automotive industry.
Where did the saved money go? All smashed into the configuration sheet. Thus, a peculiar phenomenon appeared in the market: Leapmotor C series at the price range of 150,000 to 200,000, offered space, fridge, TV, big sofa, and smart cockpit of Li Auto L series level, people nicknamed it "half-price Li Auto"; When B01 launched, it directly benchmarked Model 3, breaking 10,000 locked orders in 72 hours. Executives hurriedly clarified "we are not half-price Li Auto", resulting in the topic trending on social media— but for consumers in Tier 3 and Tier 4 cities, this label was the best advertisement.
03 County Towns are the Main BattlefieldThis just happens to answer the question at the beginning: why Leapmotor can't be seen in Tier 1 cities?
Because Leapmotor never intended to fight in Tier 1 cities. Tier 1 cities have scarce license plates, consumers buying cars buy not just transportation, but also identity, brand narratives and emotional value are there a must-have. While over 90% of Leapmotor's sales channels are dealer stores, these stores are heavily located in places like Linyi, Luoyang, Xiangyang, Zunyi—those are the true hinterlands of the Chinese auto market, The 100,000 to 200,000 family car market is the largest and most ruthless, BYD, Geely, and Changan all fight closely here.
Consumers here don't talk about sentiment, they only calculate accounts: Is there enough space for the family, is the range solid, is the configuration worth the price. Leapmotor's answer is simple and ruthless—Same money, I give you more stuff. In an era where consumers clutch their wallets, this is the hardest reason to refute.
04 Two Destinies for Going OverseasWorth mentioning is going overseas. In the past two years, going overseas has almost become a lifeline for all Chinese auto companies, but straws can also drown people.
Neta Auto was the most painful sample. In 2022 it was still the new force sales champion, annual sales of 152,000 units, Turning to the Thai market, it once captured over 11% of the pure electric share, without equal glory. But after domestic sales collapsed, the broken capital chain dragged everything down: Thai dealers shrank from over a dozen to 3, owners waiting for parts for repairs, insurance companies refused coverage, old models price halved but no one asked. In May 2025, Neta's parent company was applied for bankruptcy review. Going overseas failed to save it, because going overseas has never just tested if the car can be sold, but also if capital, channels, and after-sales systems can hold on.
Leapmotor took a completely different path. In 2023, it sold about 20% of shares to the world's fourth-largest auto group Stellantis, both parties established a joint venture Leapmotor International, Stellantis held 51% shares, responsible for global markets outside Greater China. Simply put, Leapmotor provides cars and technology, Stellantis provides money and channels— selling their cars using others' ready-made stores, almost no expansion costs incurred.
The effect was astonishing. In less than two years, Leapmotor rolled out over 1000 outlets in Europe, covering 36 countries. In Italy, in May this year, for every three pure electric cars sold, one was a Leapmotor. Overseas sales 70,000 units in 2025, this year first three quarters reached nearly 150,000. More importantly, the gross margin of selling cars overseas is close to 20%, far higher than domestic— this business is not only runnable but also profitable. Neta died on "shipping cars abroad", Leapmotor won on "letting locals sell for themselves".
05 Leapmotor's Secret is that There Is No SecretOf course, saying Leapmotor is set to win now is premature.
Looking at the financial report, in the first half of this year Leapmotor's net profit was 210 million yuan, spread across 356,000 vehicles, earning less than 600 yuan per car. If the price war continues, this thin profit could be worn through at any time. Looking upwards, the D series above 200,000 has to face users who truly care about brands, the "value for money" card will become a burden in the high-end market; Looking long-term, the arms race of intelligent driving and software experience has just begun. Zhu Jiangming himself knows this, his words were: without annual sales of a million, survival is difficult.
But looking back, Leapmotor's story over these ten years is actually simple and nearly tedious: Not chasing trends, not talking about disruption, not doing fan operations, Spending money on parts, selling cars to those who really pay, calculating every bit of cost to the bone. While peers humiliated BBA at press conferences, it delivered cars one by one in county town stores.
The second half of China's new energy vehicles, the one that lasts to the end might not be the brand best at telling stories, but the one best at calculating accounts. Leapmotor's secret has never been in the window displays of Tier 1 cities, it is written on the curbs of county towns— there is no applause there, but someone is ordering with real money.
06 Hidden Worry Behind the BillThe more glittering the numbers, the less they can withstand dismantling. Leapmotor wears the halo of the sales champion, but open the 2026 financial report, the words and lines are full of tension.
The first tension is profit as thin as a cicada wing. In the first half of this year, Leapmotor's net profit per vehicle was 589 yuan— selling a car worth over 100,000, earning less than a phone. The first quarter went directly from profit to loss, net loss of 390 million yuan, gross margin fell from 14.9% to 9.4%, full-year net profit target quietly adjusted from 5 billion to 3 billion. The reason is straightforward: lithium carbonate and other raw materials are rising, and it dares not raise prices. BYD's gross margin at the same time was 18.8%, Leapmotor only 11.7%, If the price war cuts one more time, who bleeds too much first is clear at a glance. "Value for money" is Leapmotor's moat, but also its ceiling— others lowering prices is a tactic, Leapmotor lowering prices is a matter of life and death.
The second point is money saved didn't become bullets for R&D. Leapmotor's R&D investment in the first half was 2.32 billion yuan, less than half of Xpeng. Intelligent driving is its acknowledged weakest board: "Joining the first echelon" was shouted for two years, the reality is C10 owners are still bitterly waiting for an OTA that delayed the whole third quarter in communities, complaints about highway navigation deviating and sudden braking without cause are everywhere. Hardware stacking can exchange for orders, but not hearts— the louder "half-price Li Auto" is shouted, the deeper "cheap" is carved on the forehead.
The third point is the brand's one-way street. D19 aims to rush towards 300,000 yuan, but what right does a brand standing on "cheap and big portion" have to let users willingly pay double? Li Auto strikes down from 400,000, unstoppable; Leapmotor strikes up from 100,000, every step is alarming. This kind of price band, going down is easy, going up is hard.
The fourth point is the life/death point of going overseas is not in our own hands. Leapmotor International's 51% shares are gripped in Stellantis' hands, Channels, tariffs, after-sales all rely on this European shipowner. At present it's smooth sailing, borrowing a boat to go out; but EU countervailing tariffs added can last five years, the threshold for localization content rises higher and higher, what if one day the shipowner can't save themselves, or wants to change a batch of cargo? Borrowed channels never truly belong to oneself.
Lastly and most hidden: 90% of sales rely on dealers. When sales declined in 2023, Leapmotor pushed inventory to dealers who publicly complained; now with monthly sales of 100,000, the temptation to push inventory is only bigger. Dealers are the cheapest expansion method, often the first string to snap— Neta's Thai dealers went from over a dozen to just three, taking only two years. The county bosses waving flags for Leapmotor today, will they be the first to jump ship tomorrow, no one dares to guarantee.