"Saving Nezha relies on Taiyi Zhenren." After news emerged that Zhejiang Taiyi Shenglian Enterprise Management Partnership intends to invest 3 billion yuan to take over Nezha Auto's parent company, Hozon New Energy, this joke quickly spread in the auto industry. The name is indeed coincidentally scripted like a play - Taiyi Zhenren saves Nezha, a myth stepping into reality.

But myth is myth, business is business. The number 3 billion is not a large figure against Nezha's debts. Hozon New Energy creditors declared total claims exceeding 26 billion yuan; of the 3 billion investment, only 1.167 billion is used to repay claims and bankruptcy expenses, while the remaining 1.833 billion goes to supplement working capital. This is like a debtor who declared 2.6 million in debt, someone offered 300,000 yuan to participate in restructuring, while most remaining debts still need to be handled themselves.

So the question arises: Why can a car manufacturer that has been out of production for nearly two years, with cumulative losses of 18.3 billion yuan over three years and unable to even pay wages, still make capital throw open 3 billion?

What exactly does 3 billion buy?

First, look at the operating entity of this transaction. Zhejiang Taiyi Shenglian was established in April 2026, specifically for this restructuring, with the actual controller being Ye Ji, chairman of Shanzi High-Tech. According to the latest clarification announcement, Shanzi High-Tech and Taiyi Shenglian have no equity control relationship; the listed company has not directly or indirectly participated in this Nezha Auto restructuring investment, it is not consolidated, and profits, losses, and risks of restructuring will not be included in the listed company's statements. This investment is currently still at the intent stage, and whether it can finally be implemented depends on creditor voting and court rulings. In other words, this entry is Ye Ji operating independently via an external platform, and risk isolation was prepared from the beginning.

In fact, Ye Ji has been laying out car manufacturing for a long time. In 2023, Shanzi High-Tech acquired Xingtai Longgang, obtained the whole vehicle production qualification for Hebei Hongxing Automobile, and launched mass-produced models in July 2024. However, the products on this manufacturing line are concentrated in logistics vehicles and export markets, without entering the mainstream passenger car market. For Ye Ji who wants to do scaled car manufacturing, he has always lacked a complete passenger car "entry ticket".

Within the market, targets that can make up for this shortcoming are extremely scarce, and Nezha Auto just happens to hold this "ticket". Hozon New Energy obtained dual vehicle manufacturing access qualifications from the NDRC and MIIT in 2017 and 2018 respectively, which is the scarce "dual qualification" for new energy vehicle manufacturing in the industry. In 2023, the MIIT tightened outsourcing rules, requiring both sides of the outsourcing cooperation to possess production qualifications, completely raising the barriers to entry for the industry. By today, there is almost no possibility of landing a new application for car manufacturing qualifications. To enter the game, one can only enter via a shortcut by acquiring existing qualification entities.

Taiyi Shenglian also wrote very straightforwardly in the restructuring draft: the management team "has rich automotive industry operation experience and bankruptcy restructuring experience". The core objective of this investment is "to maintain 'dual manufacturing qualifications'". Hozon New Energy's administrators also specifically emphasized this point when recruiting trustees; if the dual qualifications cannot be protected, Nezha will lose the key chips to attract investment.

Besides qualifications, Nezha has also left three factories and a brand awareness. A 350 mu factory in Tongxiang, Zhejiang, and production bases in Yichun, Jiangxi, and Nanning, Guangxi, with a total annual production capacity design of 300,000 units. At the brand level, Nezha topped the EV startups sales champion with a delivery volume of 152,000 units in 2022, cumulatively accumulating over 440,000 global owners. These assets alone have limited value, but packaged together, for companies wanting to quickly enter the new energy track, it is indeed a time-saving shortcut.

Of course, while capital sees entry opportunities, creditors' situation is not so glamorous. Hozon New Energy ordinary claims are about 11.7 billion yuan, involving over 1,600 households, with a repayment rate for the part under 800,000 yuan being about 12%, while parts exceeding 800,000 yuan directly implement debt-for-equity swap. Priority claims are about 2.2 billion yuan, paying only interest for the first three years, and repaying principal starting from the fourth year. Local state-owned asset losses are even heavier; the Yichun state-owned asset platform's nearly 2 billion yuan equity investment and 300 million yuan infrastructure support investment from local state-owned enterprises are basically hard to recover in this restructuring plan.

Exactly because of the extreme contrast of interest structure in this transaction, the market maintains a rational attitude towards Nezha's rebirth. Some creditors judge: the possibility of this restructuring plan passing is very high, but whether Nezha Auto can truly resume mass production still needs observation.

The Truth Behind the "League of Resurrected"

Nezha is not the first new car brand to attempt "resurrection" via capital. In the past two years, WM Motor and HiPhi successively walked into bankruptcy reorganization. The three paths each had differences, but the underlying logic had similarities.

WM Motor took the model of local government participation coupled with industrial capital. In April 2025, the court approved WM Motor's restructuring plan, Shenzhen Xiangfei Automobile became the new shareholder, promising to invest over 10 billion yuan, planning to restart mass production of EX5 and E5 at the Wenzhou base. Xiangfei presented a development plan that was quite ambitious at the time, aiming to challenge annual production of 1 million units and revenue of 120 billion yuan by 2030. But until the end of 2025, WM Motor did not welcome scaled resumption of production.

HiPhi chose to introduce overseas capital and bind to local existing capacity. In May 2025, Lebanese electric vehicle company EV Electra established a new company with registered capital of $143 million, holding 69.8% shares. The capital side targeted Yancheng factory's existing capacity, car manufacturing qualifications, and the premium potential for going global of the HiPhi brand in the Middle East and European markets. However, by early 2026, the follow-up funds promised by EV Electra did not arrive on schedule, and the Yancheng base did not start large-scale resumption of work.

Reviewing these three cases, one can see a common trend: in restructuring plan planning, enterprises no longer prioritize participating in head-on competition in the domestic market, but instead turn their eyes to overseas or regional markets. Nezha's first phase plan for this restructuring is exactly resuming production of Nezha X targeting overseas, with an annual sales target of 10,000 units.

But this is exactly another difficulty. Thailand was once the market where Nezha's going global was most effective; in 2024, the full-year sales volume there was 7,969 units, ranking 3rd among global brands in the Thai new energy market. However, with the domestic parent company falling into debt crisis, dealers in Thailand shrank from over 60 to about 20, after-sales capability declined significantly, and the Thai Ministry of Finance even planned to sue the Nezha Thailand subsidiary through legal channels to recover subsidies of over 2 billion Baht issued since 2022.

However, in Nezha's "resurrection" story, the most subtle role is actually local state-owned assets. They were once the main funding source during Nezha's expansion phase, and under the current restructuring plan, most initial investments are hard to recover. Taiyi Shenglian invests 3 billion yuan to exchange for about 70.62% equity, original shareholders' equity is significantly diluted, value basically zeroed out. New capital takes over a complete car manufacturing qualification and production capacity assets at a lower cost, while losses and sunk costs accumulated over many past years are basically borne by original investors and creditors.

A detail worth noting is that Ye Ji is not attempting to take over Nezha for the first time. In June 2025, Shanzi High-Tech confirmed as intended strategic investor, and in September of the same year became the sole qualified restructuring intended party, at the time throwing out a 4.5 billion yuan restructuring plan. But because the original restructuring plan draft was not submitted on schedule, the Tongxiang court ruled to terminate the original restructuring procedure, Hozon New Energy once entered bankruptcy liquidation, and this 4.5 billion plan became void. The current 3 billion plan has shrunk by one-third compared to the beginning, and some creditors have publicly expressed dissatisfaction, believing the claim repayment rate of the plan is too low.

From the initial plan for Shanzi High-Tech related entities to sign up, to the quote compressing from 4.5 billion to 3 billion, then switching to the chairman Ye Ji's off-balance SPV operation, Ye Ji's strategy is adjusting, but the goal of obtaining whole vehicle passenger car qualifications and capacity has not changed. When car manufacturing qualifications become assets that can be individually assessed and packaged for trading, when local industrial funds' multi-year investments finally only get a 12% claim repayment rate. What is actually resurrected in this so-called "resurrection", the brand or a license with relabeled tags, different parties may have different answers in their minds.

Recently, the fourth creditors' meeting for the bankruptcy reorganization case of Hozon New Energy (parent company of Nezha Cars, referred to hereinafter as Hozon New Energy) was held. The "Reorganization Plan (Draft)" disclosed the reorganization investor for the first time: Zhejiang Taiyi Shenglian Enterprise Management Partnership (Limited Partnership) (hereinafter referred to as Taiyi Shenglian) plans to contribute 3 billion yuan to acquire approximately 70.62% equity of Hozon New Energy.

Once the news broke, the terms "Nezha, Taiyi Shenglian, Yuxu" quickly sparked online discussion. Netizens soon linked these names together. The Taiyi Zhenren once used lotus flowers and leaves to reshape Nezha's physical body; now, the real-world "Taiyi Shenglian" is also preparing to pull Nezha Cars back from the brink of bankruptcy. Coincidentally, one of its shareholders is a company named "Shanzi Yuxu". Thus, "Taiyi, Yuxu, Nezha" were spliced by netizens into a real-life version of the "Fengshen Universe", bearing quite a bit of the flavor of "Fengshen Shining into Reality".

From another perspective, this may also be the intention behind Shanzi High-Tech's participation in Nezha's reorganization — to let this former new car-making force "come back to life" again. As for whether "Taiyi Shenglian" can truly help Nezha reshape its "Golden Body", no conclusion can be drawn at this moment.

Currently, what Hozon New Energy has disclosed is only the "Reorganization Plan (Draft)". Relevant procedures still need to be completed subsequently. Whether the 3 billion yuan investment funds can land fully remains to be seen. Therefore, Nezha has only seen a ray of hope at present, and there is still a long way to go before true production resumption.

Before the reorganization plan is truly implemented and takes effect, these plans are merely arrangements on paper. Having an investment plan is not equivalent to funds definitely arriving. Car companies have fallen into this pitfall in the past. HiPhi is an example: Previously, HiPhi agreed with EV Electra on a $600 million investment plan, the first installment also included a $100 million deposit, but ultimately the funds did not arrive, and the restart plan was shelved accordingly. For Nezha, passing the reorganization plan is only the first step; whether the 3 billion yuan eventually arrives is the key.

It is reported that Taiyi Shenglian was jointly established by Zhejiang Shanzi Holdings and Zhejiang Shanzi Yuxu Technology. Among them, Zhejiang Shanzi Holdings is actually controlled by Ye Ji, the chairman of Shanzi High-Tech, and one of the shareholders behind Zhejiang Shanzi Holdings is exactly the Chiji Holdings controlled by Ye Ji.

The issue lies in that both the funding strength behind it and the credit status of the actual operator add a layer of uncertainty to this 3 billion yuan investment. Shanzi High-Tech's 2026 Semi-Annual Report shows that the company's net profit attributable to shareholders for the first half of the year was only 30.8296 million yuan, a year-on-year decline of 85.69%; the net profit excluding non-recurring gains and losses was a loss of 349 million yuan; as of the end of June, total liabilities were about 4.48 billion yuan, with a debt-to-asset ratio of 61.28%. Meanwhile, business registration information shows that Chiji Holdings Group has been listed as a dishonest judgment debtor restricted from high consumption, and Ye Ji himself is also restricted from high consumption.

Against this background, whether the 3 billion yuan can arrive on time and in full naturally became a hurdle Nezha's reorganization cannot bypass. If funds cannot land, the production resumption and reorganization plan for Nezha Cars will be difficult to truly advance.

Further speaking, even if this 3 billion yuan arrives smoothly, the road in front of Nezha is not easy either.

According to the reorganization draft, 1.167 billion yuan of the 3 billion yuan will be used to pay off relevant claims and bankruptcy expenses. Only 1.833 billion yuan is truly left for the enterprise's subsequent operations, which also needs to cover expenses such as production resumption, supply chain, and after-sales recovery. In the capital-intensive car manufacturing industry, 1.833 billion yuan is obviously not generous.

It should be known that new force car companies invest in the hundreds of billions from platform R&D, new car development to channel deployment. NIO founder Li Bin once disclosed that NIO's cumulative R&D investment has exceeded 60 billion yuan; Li Auto's 2026 R&D budget is about 12 billion yuan. In comparison, Nezha's 1.833 billion yuan looks more like funds for "rebooting" rather than sufficient ammunition to support a full recovery.

Moreover, Nezha Cars also carries huge debts, and the total amount of claims declared by its parent company Hozon New Energy has exceeded 26 billion yuan. Under the circumstances of limited funds and existing debt pressure, 3 billion yuan can allow Nezha to reboot, but relying on this money to turn the tables completely is obviously not that easy. Therefore, Nezha chose a more cautious path.

From the perspective of the reorganization draft, Nezha Cars will take the route of "Overseas First, Domestic Second", prioritizing the resumption of production for Nezha X, and focusing on markets such as Southeast Asia and Latin America. Among them, the Thai market is a relatively solid foundation within Nezha's overseas markets. In 2023, Nezha sold 12,777 vehicles locally, once taking the second place in the Thai new energy market, and also landed local factories and sales networks. It can be seen that this time Nezha first avoids the fierce price war in the domestic new energy car market, and turns to find a breakthrough point in overseas markets with existing user and channel foundations. For Nezha at present, this is more realistic than returning to the domestic market to face it head-on.

But in fact, the overseas market is not as easy to break through as imagined. Taking Thailand as an example, Chinese car companies such as BYD, Great Wall, Chery, and Changan have all laid out local factories, lowering costs through localized production, and the intensity of price wars is no less than in the domestic market. In addition, Nezha also has to face issues such as local regulations, exchange rates, and after-sales networks; going overseas is also a hard battle.

More realistically, it is whether Nezha can reconnect the overseas supply chain and sales channels. After experiencing production stoppage and reorganization, whether overseas suppliers are willing to resume supply and whether distributors are willing to restock needs to rebuild trust again. It is the same for overseas consumers; after the brand experiences production stoppage and reorganization, whether after-sales, parts, and maintenance can keep up will also affect the car buying decision.

On balance, if the reorganization lands smoothly, Nezha Cars may have the opportunity to complete the first phase of production resumption and achieve small-batch overseas delivery. But wanting to return to the glory moment of delivering 152,000 vehicles in the whole year of 2022 and taking the sales crown of new forces, the difficulty is no longer on the same level.

After all, Nezha Cars only has 1.833 billion yuan that can truly be used for operations. This money needs to support supply chain restart, overseas channel operations, and also restore after-sales services; the remaining funds are not sufficient. How far this reorganization can ultimately go, ultimately depends on Nezha Cars' subsequent production resumption progress and overseas sales.