Recently, the fourth creditors' meeting for the bankruptcy reorganization case of Hozon New Energy (parent company of Nezha Cars, referred to hereinafter as Hozon New Energy) was held. The "Reorganization Plan (Draft)" disclosed the reorganization investor for the first time: Zhejiang Taiyi Shenglian Enterprise Management Partnership (Limited Partnership) (hereinafter referred to as Taiyi Shenglian) plans to contribute 3 billion yuan to acquire approximately 70.62% equity of Hozon New Energy.
Once the news broke, the terms "Nezha, Taiyi Shenglian, Yuxu" quickly sparked online discussion. Netizens soon linked these names together. The Taiyi Zhenren once used lotus flowers and leaves to reshape Nezha's physical body; now, the real-world "Taiyi Shenglian" is also preparing to pull Nezha Cars back from the brink of bankruptcy. Coincidentally, one of its shareholders is a company named "Shanzi Yuxu". Thus, "Taiyi, Yuxu, Nezha" were spliced by netizens into a real-life version of the "Fengshen Universe", bearing quite a bit of the flavor of "Fengshen Shining into Reality".

From another perspective, this may also be the intention behind Shanzi High-Tech's participation in Nezha's reorganization — to let this former new car-making force "come back to life" again. As for whether "Taiyi Shenglian" can truly help Nezha reshape its "Golden Body", no conclusion can be drawn at this moment.
Currently, what Hozon New Energy has disclosed is only the "Reorganization Plan (Draft)". Relevant procedures still need to be completed subsequently. Whether the 3 billion yuan investment funds can land fully remains to be seen. Therefore, Nezha has only seen a ray of hope at present, and there is still a long way to go before true production resumption.
Before the reorganization plan is truly implemented and takes effect, these plans are merely arrangements on paper. Having an investment plan is not equivalent to funds definitely arriving. Car companies have fallen into this pitfall in the past. HiPhi is an example: Previously, HiPhi agreed with EV Electra on a $600 million investment plan, the first installment also included a $100 million deposit, but ultimately the funds did not arrive, and the restart plan was shelved accordingly. For Nezha, passing the reorganization plan is only the first step; whether the 3 billion yuan eventually arrives is the key.

It is reported that Taiyi Shenglian was jointly established by Zhejiang Shanzi Holdings and Zhejiang Shanzi Yuxu Technology. Among them, Zhejiang Shanzi Holdings is actually controlled by Ye Ji, the chairman of Shanzi High-Tech, and one of the shareholders behind Zhejiang Shanzi Holdings is exactly the Chiji Holdings controlled by Ye Ji.
The issue lies in that both the funding strength behind it and the credit status of the actual operator add a layer of uncertainty to this 3 billion yuan investment. Shanzi High-Tech's 2026 Semi-Annual Report shows that the company's net profit attributable to shareholders for the first half of the year was only 30.8296 million yuan, a year-on-year decline of 85.69%; the net profit excluding non-recurring gains and losses was a loss of 349 million yuan; as of the end of June, total liabilities were about 4.48 billion yuan, with a debt-to-asset ratio of 61.28%. Meanwhile, business registration information shows that Chiji Holdings Group has been listed as a dishonest judgment debtor restricted from high consumption, and Ye Ji himself is also restricted from high consumption.
Against this background, whether the 3 billion yuan can arrive on time and in full naturally became a hurdle Nezha's reorganization cannot bypass. If funds cannot land, the production resumption and reorganization plan for Nezha Cars will be difficult to truly advance.

Further speaking, even if this 3 billion yuan arrives smoothly, the road in front of Nezha is not easy either.
According to the reorganization draft, 1.167 billion yuan of the 3 billion yuan will be used to pay off relevant claims and bankruptcy expenses. Only 1.833 billion yuan is truly left for the enterprise's subsequent operations, which also needs to cover expenses such as production resumption, supply chain, and after-sales recovery. In the capital-intensive car manufacturing industry, 1.833 billion yuan is obviously not generous.
It should be known that new force car companies invest in the hundreds of billions from platform R&D, new car development to channel deployment. NIO founder Li Bin once disclosed that NIO's cumulative R&D investment has exceeded 60 billion yuan; Li Auto's 2026 R&D budget is about 12 billion yuan. In comparison, Nezha's 1.833 billion yuan looks more like funds for "rebooting" rather than sufficient ammunition to support a full recovery.
Moreover, Nezha Cars also carries huge debts, and the total amount of claims declared by its parent company Hozon New Energy has exceeded 26 billion yuan. Under the circumstances of limited funds and existing debt pressure, 3 billion yuan can allow Nezha to reboot, but relying on this money to turn the tables completely is obviously not that easy. Therefore, Nezha chose a more cautious path.

From the perspective of the reorganization draft, Nezha Cars will take the route of "Overseas First, Domestic Second", prioritizing the resumption of production for Nezha X, and focusing on markets such as Southeast Asia and Latin America. Among them, the Thai market is a relatively solid foundation within Nezha's overseas markets. In 2023, Nezha sold 12,777 vehicles locally, once taking the second place in the Thai new energy market, and also landed local factories and sales networks. It can be seen that this time Nezha first avoids the fierce price war in the domestic new energy car market, and turns to find a breakthrough point in overseas markets with existing user and channel foundations. For Nezha at present, this is more realistic than returning to the domestic market to face it head-on.
But in fact, the overseas market is not as easy to break through as imagined. Taking Thailand as an example, Chinese car companies such as BYD, Great Wall, Chery, and Changan have all laid out local factories, lowering costs through localized production, and the intensity of price wars is no less than in the domestic market. In addition, Nezha also has to face issues such as local regulations, exchange rates, and after-sales networks; going overseas is also a hard battle.
More realistically, it is whether Nezha can reconnect the overseas supply chain and sales channels. After experiencing production stoppage and reorganization, whether overseas suppliers are willing to resume supply and whether distributors are willing to restock needs to rebuild trust again. It is the same for overseas consumers; after the brand experiences production stoppage and reorganization, whether after-sales, parts, and maintenance can keep up will also affect the car buying decision.

On balance, if the reorganization lands smoothly, Nezha Cars may have the opportunity to complete the first phase of production resumption and achieve small-batch overseas delivery. But wanting to return to the glory moment of delivering 152,000 vehicles in the whole year of 2022 and taking the sales crown of new forces, the difficulty is no longer on the same level.
After all, Nezha Cars only has 1.833 billion yuan that can truly be used for operations. This money needs to support supply chain restart, overseas channel operations, and also restore after-sales services; the remaining funds are not sufficient. How far this reorganization can ultimately go, ultimately depends on Nezha Cars' subsequent production resumption progress and overseas sales.