Beijing Hyundai and Yueda Kia: Who Went Down the Wrong Path?

On October 30, 2026, an insider at Beijing Hyundai confirmed a matter: General Manager Li Fenggang left office due to "personal reasons", falling nine days short of completing the one-year term since his formal appointment on November 10, 2025.

Li Fenggang's employment contract was for three years, but he served only one. A few days before his departure, Yonhap News Agency released a set of figures: In September, combined retail sales of Hyundai and Kia in China totaled approximately 9,000 units, with monthly sales falling below the 10,000-unit mark and market share at 0.6%. Among them, Hyundai sold about 4,000 units, a year-on-year decline of 47%; Kia sold about 5,000 units, a year-on-year decline of 31%.

Unexpectedly, it was these two events that brought Korean cars back into the industry spotlight. Recently, Beijing Hyundai and Yueda Kia had just made a good impression on social media platforms for issuing generous holiday bonuses and gift packages to employees during the Mid-Autumn Festival and National Day.

Forgotten Glory

Korean cars had experienced glory in the Chinese market.

In 2016, Beijing Hyundai sold 1.142 million units, Yueda Kia sold 650,000 units, totaling nearly 1.8 million units for both. Their market share approached 10%, securing a stable position as the third pillar of the joint venture camp, second only to Volkswagen and GM.

Even earlier, in 2013, Beijing Hyundai's annual sales exceeded 1 million units, making it the third domestic manufacturer to achieve single-brand production and sales of over 1 million, following FAW-VW and Shanghai-VW. The feat Toyota, Honda, and Nissan had not yet achieved, Hyundai accomplished earlier.

Those years marked the true "street car era" for Korean cars in China. Elantras and K5s were parked downstairs at countless homes, with a constant flow of customers in dealerships. At auto shows, due to the presence of Korean celebrities, the Beijing Hyundai exhibition booth was surrounded tightly, tickets were scalped to double the price, and the glass doors of the exhibition hall were even damaged by the crush.

Beijing Hyundai, the star automaker of the time, was established in October 2002, with BAIC and Hyundai each holding a 50% stake. In August of the same year, Dongfeng Yueda Kia was established earlier in Yancheng, Jiangsu, with Dongfeng, Yueda, and Kia each holding 25%, 25%, and 50% respectively.

Both Korean brand joint venture companies used a similar strategy: high configuration, low price, and fast introduction. Three months after the establishment of Dongfeng Yueda Kia, the first car, the Spectra, rolled off the assembly line, quickly entering the compact family sedan market. Beijing Hyundai also launched its first Sonata at the end of the same year, subsequently entering the official and business vehicle market.

Afterwards, Cerato, Forte, Sportage, K3, Sportage, K5, Elantra, Accent, Tucson, ix35 were deployed one after another with tacit understanding between the two brands. Hyundai focused on bringing down the price of joint venture cars, while Kia focused on making joint venture cars better looking. Together, they pinned the image of Korean cars to "cheap, good looking, high configuration".

Both companies were busy expanding capacity in those years. Beijing Hyundai located factories in Cangzhou and Chongqing outside of Shunyi, Beijing, once arranging five factories; Yueda Kia owns three factories in Yancheng. As capacity expanded, everyone assumed growth would continue, no one thought about what would happen if these factories became empty in the future.

Turning Point and Divergence

The turning point came suddenly. In early 2017, the THAAD incident escalated, and the status of Korean goods in the minds of Chinese consumers declined rapidly. This matter was beyond the control of enterprises, yet it happened to hit the vital point of Korean cars.

Both Beijing Hyundai and Dongfeng Yueda Kia faced declines in 2017. Beijing Hyundai's sales dropped to 785,000 units that year, a year-on-year decline of 31.3%; Dongfeng Yueda Kia dropped to about 360,000 units, a year-on-year decrease of 45%, nearly halved.

The turning point of Korean car sales in China was of course not decided by the THAAD incident. THAAD was the trigger, but not the root cause. There was a consensus on this within both companies at the time and among outsiders. The Korean side summarized that "they lacked excellent SUV products on the hottest track", while Kia frankly admitted "they were too optimistic, there were mistakes in product promotion and pricing".

Both enterprises subsequently launched price reduction promotions. Beijing Hyundai even launched a new Verna starting at 49,900 yuan. In 2018, Beijing Hyundai's sales briefly stabilized, and Dongfeng Yueda Kia saw a slight increase.

But this was more like a fleeting recovery, followed by a more terrifying decline channel. The sales of both companies continued to drop, with rumors of selling factories and contracting channels. It was from here that both sides moved in different directions.

For Beijing Hyundai, the demands and propositions of the Chinese and Korean shareholders diverged. The Chinese side hoped to support channels and market share with higher sales targets; the Korean side hoped to reduce losses with more conservative targets. The Chinese side advocated for drastic cost reduction and introducing the local supply chain; the Korean side tended to protect the existing Korean supplier system, with nearly 80% of Beijing Hyundai's suppliers belonging to the Korean system.

A 50:50 shareholding ratio, placed on a pair of equally strong and unwilling shareholders, became a stalemate that was difficult to reconcile when facing difficulties and challenges. Falling upon Beijing Hyundai, this joint venture, it resulted in fatal management infighting and long-term strategic ambiguity. The company did not know where to drift amid intense competition and disorder.

In 2024, Beijing Hyundai's annual sales reached 154,200 units. This is the eighth year of continuous decline from 1.142 million units.

On the other side in the same year, Yueda Kia's annual sales rebounded to 248,000 units, a year-on-year growth of 49.2%. This figure was mainly driven by exports.

In July 2018, Chun Byung-jin, the newly appointed deputy president of Kia, assumed the role of General Manager of Dongfeng Yueda Kia. The following month, Dongfeng Yueda Kia received its first overseas export order: 400 Vistos dispatched to Egypt. From receiving the order to shipping, it totaled just under four months.

From this speed, it can be seen that the Korean side almost immediately determined the export strategy for Dongfeng Yueda Kia after Chun Byung-jin took office, attempting to transfer the problem of insufficient capacity utilization at Chinese factories through Kia's global network.

After the 400 Vistos were dispatched to Egypt, the second batch of 856 Vistos immediately loaded at Shanghai Port, of which 200 continued to Egypt, and 656 were sent to the Philippines. A few days later, the first batch of 288 engines also loaded for export to Slovakia. Afterwards came more intensive exports of complete vehicles and engines.

In December 2021, Dongfeng Yueda Kia welcomed a more important turning point. Dongfeng listed its 25% equity in the hands for transfer at 297 million yuan. Jiangsu Yueda, as the sole bidder, took over. "Dongfeng Yueda Kia" was renamed "Yueda Kia".

After Dongfeng withdrew, Yueda Kia's shareholders became two parties. Although the shareholding ratio was also 50:50, Yueda Kia's internal structure was obviously simpler. The voice of the Korean side remained dominant. After the equity change, the decision-making chain became shorter, and the Korean side's voice was heavier.

Yueda Kia also established a management system consistent with Kia's global standards. Only one person was appointed as the head of each department, and the dual-signature system was abolished. A departing executive of a joint venture company once evaluated the dual-signature system: "The essence is to ensure the shareholders' own interests through dispatched managers, rather than the interests of the joint venture company".

Without the management infighting of the dual-signature system, Yueda Kia, which was completely under Korean control, when facing a more intense price war in the Chinese market, its strategy leaned more towards exports. The Yancheng factory was explicitly designated as an export hub in Kia's global network. Although the company still shouted "In China, for China", the weight of exports became heavier year by year.

Who is Right and Who is Wrong?

In 2025, signs of improvement began to appear at Beijing Hyundai. First, the two shareholders seemed to reach a consensus on strategy.

In March of that year, BAIC and Hyundai jointly increased capital by 8 billion yuan. In October, the "Smart Start 2030 Plan" was released, setting the goal: to launch 20 new products in the next 4 to 5 years, achieve annual sales of 500,000 units in 5 years (300,000 domestically, 200,000 exports), and strengthen the strategy of "In China, for China, towards the world".

In Yantai and Shanghai, Beijing Hyundai established R&D branches led by Chinese engineers, with a scale exceeding 1,300 people, focusing on new energy development, intelligent driving, and intelligent cockpits, aiming to enhance product definition and technical route dominance in the Chinese market.

In November of the same year, Li Fenggang, the first Chinese general manager since the establishment of Beijing Hyundai, was appointed. This appointment was interpreted as a move by Hyundai Motor Global CEO Scott Oh to push for management localization. Scott Oh took office in January 2025. He is the first non-Korean Global CEO in Hyundai Motor's history, advocating operating local markets with people who better understand the local market.

Beijing Hyundai also achieved sales of 210,000 units in 2025, welcoming rare growth after 8 years of decline, and exports also began to accelerate.

Li Fenggang naturally wanted to do something radical. After taking office, he proposed "Integration Direct Sales", wanting customers to order online with unified national prices. At the Beijing Auto Show in April 2026, the "Star Sprint Plan" was released, with the goal to expand the dealer network from more than 200 to 484 by 2030.

But news of his departure came even faster. According to informed sources, the resource allocation power and decision-making initiative Li Fenggang actually obtained did not match his title. In the management sequence dispatched by the Korean side, the progress of supplementing Chinese personnel was limited, and key positions remained dominated by Korean nationals. There were rumors that management wanted the Yantai Technology Center to support Beijing Hyundai's work, and part of their energy had to be spent on "dining with the Korean R&D team".

The goals of the two shareholders still remain difficult to align. The divergence still centers on the core issue of maintaining sales versus reducing losses. The Chinese side hopes to set higher sales targets and reduce costs to a greater extent. But cost reduction, in the view of the Korean side, is not just a financial issue, but a matter involving vested interests of the Hyundai Korea headquarters.

Until September 2026, the Chinese and Korean shareholders barely reached a consensus, giving up higher sales targets. Annual sales were set at about 160,000 units, and losses were controlled at around 1.9 billion yuan.

Shortly after this consensus was confirmed, news of Li Fenggang's departure was leaked, stating he left for "personal reasons". An internal representative of Hyundai China stated, "We recognize the measures taken during his tenure very much internally".

At this time, Yueda Kia was in a completely different situation. In 2025, Yueda Kia's annual sales reached 254,000 units, showing positive growth for two consecutive years. But among these, exports were 173,000 units (accounting for 68%), and domestic sales were 81,000 units (accounting for 32%).

By September 2026, Yueda Kia had cumulatively exported over 666,400 complete vehicles, with export sales breaking through 7.44 billion USD, covering 92 countries and regions; engines cumulatively exported exceeded 550,000 units, sold to South Korea, Russia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and other places.

Exports also supported the company's profits. In 2025, Yueda Kia's net profit reached 843 million yuan, finally turning losses into profits. After the company made money, Yueda Kia also timely shared the wealth with employees.

In 2025, Yueda Kia adjusted wages generally. Production posts had a performance-based wage increase of 100 yuan per month; management posts had a combined salary grade and performance wage increase of 225 yuan per month; annual bonuses were issued for 3 months, 0.5 months more than the previous year.

In June 2026, Yueda Kia adjusted wages generally again. Regarding this salary increase, internal notices stated: "The 2026 global automotive market faces heavy challenges, including rising raw material costs due to Middle East geopolitical conflicts, exchange rate fluctuations, and intensified internal competition in the domestic passenger car market. However, on the management level, we persist in 'people-oriented', recognizing employee dedication, therefore implementing a salary increase for all employees".

During the Mid-Autumn Festival and National Day in 2026, Yueda Kia issued 1,400 yuan in cash holiday bonuses (1,000 yuan from the company + 400 yuan from the union) plus snack gift packs and mooncakes. After Yueda Kia employees posted this on social media, it sparked much discussion among netizens.

Some netizens praised the employee protection and humanistic care of Korean car companies. This point is indeed unquestionable. Even for Beijing Hyundai, where the situation is not easy, non-poor double holiday welfare was also sent to employees: 500-1,000 yuan in cash holiday bonuses plus physical gifts. This welfare, placed in the entire automotive industry in 2026, can be considered decent.

Of course, some suspected departing employees complained about large-scale layoffs in recent years due to the marginalization of Korean cars in China. Compared to ensuring the welfare of current employees, departing employees hope for long-term job security. Even if everyone drinks porridge, it is better than some eating and others drinking water.

Who is right and who is wrong? There are no standard answers to many things in the world. Just as Borges wrote in "The Garden of Forking Paths": Time forever forks, leading to countless futures. We walk different paths, no one knows whether flowers bloom on the other path.

Ten years have passed. Although Korean cars have been marginalized, both companies are still here. Like all other automakers, they strive to set off towards the future. As for how the future will unfold, no one can answer at this time.