Editor's Note: Two years into the Panyu Action, GAC Group has returned to the growth channel; however, Hyper has gone from "no limits" to "monthly sales in the hundreds".

The "Panyu Action" deep reform proposed by GAC Group has been implemented for nearly two years. From a superficial data perspective, it seems the group is developing in a positive direction.

According to the group's latest sales data, from January to July, GAC Group's sales exceeded 886,000 units, a slight year-on-year increase of 1.28%; new energy vehicles were 311,700 units, a year-on-year increase of 66.2%; independent brand sales exceeded 400,000 units in the first 7 months, a significant year-on-year increase of 33.31%.

But in this seemingly prosperous development, one brand quietly disappeared from sight, and that is Hyper.

In the sales bulletin, Hyper's sales were reported bundled within "Hyper AION BU 210,400 units". Externally it looks like a 62% high growth, but when broken down, Hyper's own retail sales from January to July were 5,108 units, a drop by half compared to 14,828 units in the same period of 2025. BU merger makes the report look good, but it also hides Hyper's true situation.

In GAC Group's 2026 story of independent brand growth, AION exited the hole, Trumpchi defended the position, Qijing carried the image, all written smoothly. Only Hyper is the reverse stroke in the same story, where can it go with its monthly sales hovering in the hundreds?

The "Fig Leaf" Under Consolidated Reports

GAC launched the independent brand BU reform on December 18, 2025. Hyper and AION were the first to form the "Hyper AION BU". By the end of March 2026, the channels of both brands were fully integrated. Hyper's service network joined AION's network system of over 1,000 outlets from about 200.

The direct effect of consolidated reporting is a good-looking report: From January to July 2026, "Hyper AION BU" accumulated 210,400 units, a year-on-year increase of 62.08%, and July's single month 28,807 units, a year-on-year increase of 36.37%. However, after the denominator is expanded by AION's volume-selling cars, Hyper's hundreds-level monthly sales are completely diluted.

When the outside world questioned whether Hyper should exit with dignity, Zhongche Network contacted GAC Group's PR and sales personnel respectively. The former replied: Hyper reflects GAC's technical accumulation, currently brand operations are normal, everything follows the official announcement.

While a salesperson close to GAC admitted in communication: "Now the group talks about high new energy growth externally, BU merger is the easiest way to handle. But internally KPIs are still backed separately. Hyper's inventory coefficient and terminal discounts are much uglier than AION's.

The merger of AION and Hyper is not an isolated case in the auto industry. After traditional major factories suffer setbacks in climbing up, using "merger" to hide failed brands inside the mother brand's sales is an unspoken industry practice. But sales can be merged, user mindsets cannot——when a brand needs to rely on a brother brand's endorsement to appear in financial report summaries, its own market subjectivity has already loosened.

Four Years of Failed High-End Push

Hyper debuted in September 2022 as "AION's high-end sub-brand", starting with a million-yuan SSR supercar. The slogan was "Benchmark for Chinese high-end intelligent electric vehicles", and GAC Group had high hopes for it at the time.

Time came to 2024, to tear off the AION ride-hailing label, Hyper separated and became independent; In January 2025 it was upgraded to one of the three independent brands listed alongside Trumpchi and AION. Feng Xingya promised on the HL pre-sale site "no limits on investment for the next three years".

But the development of events seemed not smooth. In 2025, Hyper retail was about 15,150 units, completing less than 20% of the early 80,000-unit target; SSR 7 units for the year, GT 802 units, main force HT 9,885 units down 31% year-on-year, HL 4,464 units. In December 2025, after being independent for 11 months, it merged back into AION BU.

Focusing on Hyper's product line also presents a sense of "split": During SSR/GT/HT era, spoke of sports performance, HL suddenly turned to "Family Luxury Flagship", A800 embraced Huawei Qunkun Intelligent Driving for Tech Business, S600 pulled the starting price down to 179,900, fully loaded configurations but high-end narrative seems somewhat unfeasible.

In one showroom, a 1.28 million supercar and an 180,000 SUV are parked simultaneously. Sales staff speak of 1.9-second 0-100 acceleration and also HarmonyOS office. Users' brand image of Hyper is naturally diluted amidst left-right swinging.

Reviewing the long river of the entire auto industry history, the essence of high-end brands is scarcity and consistency. Porsche from 911 to Cayenne revolved around "Driving Machine", Mercedes-Benz from S to A-Class only delivered "Luxury and Prestige". In four years, Hyper tried everything: supercar, family SUV, Huawei smart driving sedan, cost-effective SUV——every one was an industry hotspot at the time, but linked together it is not a strategy.

Qijing Takes the Top, Hyper Hovers

Hyper's status became increasingly awkward after the Qijing brand was launched.

Qijing is the native fusion product of GAC + Huawei Qunkun "Shared Office, Same-Frequency Decision Making". The first GT7 was launched in June 2026, globally first equipped with Qunkun ADS 5. In July, completed over 1 billion yuan strategic capital injection introducing CATL. Feng Xingya clearly stated "Qijing is placed at the group's highest priority". Resources, scripts, channel focus clearly migrated.

Thus Hyper fell into the awkwardness of relying on neither end: Downward, S600 starting price dipped to 179,900, overlapping with AION N60/i60 price range, afraid to squeeze AION base; Upward, A800 used Huawei solution but didn't sell better than same platform GAC Toyota Platinum 7, couldn't touch Qijing GT7's pure Huawei endorsement; Internally shared supply chain channels with AION, external perception still "Slightly More Expensive AION"; Externally no differentiating long board, April 2026 A800 monthly retail 59 units, SSR has been zero for many months.

Zhongche Network noticed in GAC's mid-term meeting it stated Hyper "continuously improving high-end product layout", S600 fills high-end matrix—but when a high-end brand needs to prove its existence with "Starting from 179,900", the word "high-end" itself has become a joke.

Reviewing Hyper's development in the past few years, it's not hard to find what it stepped on is actually the common dead end of traditional auto manufacturers' new energy high-end push—the foundation isn't solid, yet rushing to build the building.

It was born at AION's potential high point, but AION's label is B-end and cost-performance, C-end high-end mindset is almost blank; Trumpchi also cannot support the facade of first-tier independent high-end. Old factories that didn't even stand up in the fuel car era, expecting to change fate just by changing names in the new energy era, was itself a house of cards.

More fatal is, high-end requires scarcity and exclusivity. When Hyper became independent, it managed to complete the homework on teams and channels, but then turned to merge BU, share channels, finally the wall of separation tore down itself.

And the most confusing for users is it had no main line spanning three years from start to finish—supercar start, switched to extended range, bet on large six-seaters, hugged Huawei, price continuously dropped. Every step accurately stepped on hotspots, but also accurately crushed its own brand cognition.

Group strategy turns, brand turns around, user just remembered and was deleted, this "wanting to do everything, holding onto nothing" swinging, is its true fatal flaw.

GAC Group H1 2026 pre-loss 4.06 billion to 4.57 billion yuan, year-on-year loss expanded by more than 60%. Independent high-end push burning cash, joint venture decline, Hyper channel repeated construction sunk costs, are all background boards. In analyst Wang Ying's view, under this financial pressure, "no limits" commitment will inevitably yield to "stop bleeding first"—BU merger essence is stop loss, not upgrade.

From the current financial statement perspective, GAC Group as a whole walked out of the adjustment period in Panyu Action, new energy and exports pulled out a second curve, Qijing takes over high-end narrative, Trumpchi M8 PHEV as the 30 millionth unit deliveryed to Thailand users, group face is passable.

But Hyper's hovering is real: It neither established itself with a single clear value like Nio or Li Auto, nor was willing to be a product sequence within the main brand like Geely Galaxy; When independent didn't tear off AION shadow, after merger even the shadow belonged to AION. 2026 hundreds-level monthly sales, January-July retail halved, means it has exited "mainstream high-end brand" competition, remaining is whether group wants to give another round of resources, what name to close the problem.

Two years of Panyu Action, GAC Group has returned to growth channel; while Hyper went from "no limits" to "monthly sales in hundreds". Same group, same round of reform, upward and downward can happen simultaneously—only the downward stroke might be destined to become a stepping stone for moving forward.