
Thailand plans to implement a tiered consumption tax on electric vehicles, and the automotive trade environment in Southeast Asia is shifting significantly.
Author | Zhang Heng
In mid-October 2026, Thailand's Ministry of Finance released a proposal, planning to implement new rules for tiered electric vehicle consumption tax starting January 2027.
Specifically, for electric vehicle models with no local production arrangements that are directly imported as complete vehicles, the consumption tax will increase from the current 10% to not less than 30%. However, the proposal still needs to be submitted to the cabinet for review, and final implementation details still have a small margin for adjustment, but the policy direction is clear.
Thailand Tightens Electric Vehicle Policies
After the news came out, Chinese automakers had to start recalculating export costs and pricing ranges.
Specifically, this tax system is divided into three tiers based on the automaker's investment and local implementation status in Thailand: Automakers with factories in Thailand and meeting local component localization standards can continue to enjoy preferential low tax rates; Enterprises that have submitted a clear production schedule and are testing the market with a small number of imported models currently will apply to the middle tax tier; Brands with no implementation plans and relying on complete vehicle imports long-term will execute the highest tax tier.

It is worth noting that this adjustment concerns Thailand's domestic consumption tax, not import tariffs. Thailand relies on adjusting domestic tax systems to bypass tariff agreement constraints under the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, thereby raising costs for pure trade models in a targeted manner and avoiding trade friction.
Thailand launched the EV3.5 support policy for the electric vehicle industry in 2024, this rule set is used to guide automakers to set up production capacity and raise local component localization standards. On June 30, 2026, the localization accounting rules were tightened. From this node, imported battery cells no longer count towards local component statistics, and the path for automakers to only import battery cells from overseas and pack them locally in Thailand to meet localization indicators is no longer feasible.
EV3.5 is also bound by a production offset mechanism. In 2026, for every 1 complete vehicle imported by automakers enjoying preferential treatment, they need to produce 2 vehicles locally in Thailand; in 2027, this ratio increases to 1 to 3. If automakers fail to complete the corresponding production tasks, the tax incentives received earlier will be reclaimed.
This tiered consumption tax proposal in Thailand is an additional tax burden constraint added on top of the EV3.5 localization assessment framework. The two policies form a progression, continuously compressing the living space for complete vehicle import models.

Data from Thailand's Department of Land Transport and the Industrial Federation shows that in the first seven months of 2026, newly registered pure electric passenger cars in Thailand reached 126,439 units, surpassing the full-year scale of 2025. Among them, 62.58% of pure electric vehicle models came from complete vehicle imports from overseas. Chinese brands hold nearly 70% of the local pure electric vehicle market share, MG, BYD, Wuling, and Chery are the brands with high local retail sales.
Trade structure dictates that Chinese export automakers bear the most direct cost pressure.

Thailand is a traditional automotive manufacturing hub in Southeast Asia. The automotive industry contributes about 2% of its GDP, and automotive exports account for 15% of Thailand's total exports. After the market opened to electrification, local electric vehicle terminal sales rose rapidly, but most of the incremental volume stayed at the sales end, while battery, core component capacity, and high-end employment remained overseas.
This tiered consumption tax proposal is not to limit electric vehicle consumption, but to use tax differences to screen manufacturers willing to invest in heavy assets, keeping the battery, component, and complete vehicle manufacturing supply chain in Thailand, and guarding its position as the Southeast Asian automotive manufacturing center.
Southeast Asia Trade Rules Tightening
Thailand's consumption tax proposal can be said to be another ring in the continuous tightening of policies in multiple countries in Southeast Asia in recent years.
Southeast Asia is the earliest overseas training ground for Chinese independent brand passenger cars. In the early years, Chery and Geely relied on geographical location and sea transport advantages to work out the whole set of models for CKD spare parts assembly and dealer channel construction. The channels and localized operation experience accumulated in Southeast Asia also became the foundation for subsequent Chinese automakers to expand into other overseas markets.

Looking at the overall Chinese vehicle export market, Southeast Asia is still a stable incremental sector for Chinese electric vehicles. In the first half of 2026 Chinese complete vehicle export destination list, the Philippines and Thailand stably entered the top ten; looking at the electric vehicle statistical category alone, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines rank at the front for years.
In addition, Southeast Asia is also a mature RHD production capacity base. Produced models can be supplied to the Australia, New Zealand, and Commonwealth markets to share R&D and production line investment.
Looking at the entire Southeast Asian electric vehicle market, a clear tiered pattern has emerged. The market foundation of each country is different, and the industry development paths and policy orientations also differ.
Thailand belongs to the regional manufacturing hub, and is also the country where Chinese automakers have the most concentrated heavy asset implementation. BYD has built a large-scale complete vehicle production base in Thailand with an annual capacity of 150,000 units. Products cover local consumption and radiate to ASEAN and Australian markets; SAIC MG has deeply cultivated the Thai market for many years, maintaining a stable production and sales rhythm relying on local mature production lines; Great Wall Motor has acquired General Motors' idle complete vehicle factory area for renovation and production, successfully implementing local manufacturing capacity.
The automakers with implemented production capacity are less impacted by the consumption tax proposal. For brands that only import complete vehicles, the pressure will be directly manifested.

Indonesia and Malaysia belong to a group bound by resources and industry.
Indonesia holds nickel ore resources. The localization indicator of localization rate (TKDN) is rising year by year. The minimum is 40% in 2026, adjusted to 60% from 2027 to 2029, and the 2030 goal is 80%, aiming to open the closed loop chain of nickel, cathode, battery cells, and complete vehicles. Wuling's Cikarang plant in Indonesia started production as early as 2017. BYD has also laid out production lines in Indonesia. Pure complete vehicle imports have very little survival space here.
Malaysia ended the four-year tax-free period for electric vehicle complete vehicle imports on December 31, 2025. New regulations took effect in July 2026, setting a CIF price threshold of 200,000 Malaysian Ringgit (approximately 326,500 RMB) and a minimum 180kW motor threshold for imported electric vehicles. Low-priced imported models are basically kept out, guiding automakers to turn to spare parts assembly.
The Philippines is currently the most relaxed consumption market among major countries in Southeast Asia. There is no mandatory localization assessment, and it is also the single largest Southeast Asian country for Chinese complete vehicle export volume, with many trade orders concentrated here.
Vietnam is an independent closed-loop market. The local brand VinFast occupies the mainstream, supports its own charging network, and foreign brand expansion space is limited.

In the past few years, complete vehicle export was the preferred path for many Chinese automakers to enter the Southeast Asian market: complete vehicle manufacturing was completed domestically and then shipped, the model investment was light, the trial and error cost was low, and sales were opened up with cost-performance ratio. However, the continuously tightening localization regulations are gradually squeezing the profit space of this light asset model.
The overall demand for electric vehicles in Southeast Asia is still in the upward stage, and market penetration is lower than domestic, with significant long-term incremental space. However, consistent with the global trend in most regional trade, the dividend window for complete vehicle export is narrowing rapidly. In the long run, automakers who can stand firmly are mostly players willing to simultaneously implement the complete vehicle, battery, and component whole industry chain. [Copyright Notice] This article is originally created by "Auto People", owned by the publisher. Reprinting or partial copying is not allowed without authorization. Violators will be held responsible.


African resource countries tighten raw mineral exports, domestic new energy industry chains face supply challenges directly.
Author | Zhang Heng
Since 2026, major African mineral countries such as Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and Malawi have successively introduced policies to tighten exports of new energy core minerals such as lithium, cobalt, and graphite.
The simultaneous policy shifts in multiple countries clearly indicate preparation, with the goal being the Chinese new energy industry chain.
Multiple African Countries Tighten Mineral Exports
This signal of policy tightening was first released by Zimbabwe. In February 2026, the country suddenly issued an emergency suspension on raw lithium and lithium concentrate exports, even intercepting some cargo that was already loaded and about to be shipped. At that time, market analysts judged that this was not a short-term temporary control.
As expected, by May, Zimbabwe officially designated 14 categories of minerals including lithium, cobalt, and graphite as national strategic resources, mandating foreign-funded mining enterprises to introduce local shareholders, while simultaneously requiring the construction of deep processing projects within the country to firmly lock the value added by the industry chain.
Following closely, the Democratic Republic of the Congo set an export quota of 96,600 tons for cobalt ore over two years, directly significantly reducing the outflow of low-end cobalt raw materials.

This wave of resource protection policies quickly spread to East Africa and Southern Africa, with multiple countries forming a consensus to unify restrictions on exporting raw ores and coarse concentrates without smelting and processing.
The highly consistent policy steps of multiple African countries have brought severe challenges to China's new energy industry chain.
Looking back at the past decade-plus of development, the heat of African resource development was highly synchronized with the rise of China's new energy vehicle industry, deeply bundled.
China's new energy industry broke out from scratch, with power batteries and complete vehicle capacity expanding at high speed year after year, but domestic reserves of lithium and cobalt resources were insufficient and mining costs were high, making it difficult to meet demand. Africa possesses world-class new energy mineral endowments, but is constrained by insufficient funds, technology, and infrastructure, unable to develop and realize value.
Under this complementarity, China and Africa formed a mature and stable industry chain division. Chinese enterprises went overseas to improve local infrastructure and invested in mines, putting funds and complete sets of mining technology into place, helping Africa's mineral development; Africa provided stable and low-cost coarse mineral raw materials to support China's new energy industry in growing stronger.
In terms of data, the Democratic Republic of the Congo contributes 76% of global cobalt production, and over 90% of China's ternary battery cobalt raw materials rely on African imports; Zimbabwe's lithium concentrates over 90% are exported to China, accounting for 15.5% of China's total imports; Mozambique and Madagascar natural graphite continue to supply China's anode materials, which are essential raw materials for power batteries.

Relying on Africa's large-volume, stable, and reliable primary mineral supply, China mastered over 80% of global cobalt smelting and over 70% of lithium salt processing capacity, building the world's largest scale power battery and new energy vehicle manufacturing system. It can be said that the rapid development of China's new energy industry in the past decade relied on resource strategic cooperation between China and Africa.
As China's new energy industry gradually matures, the attitude of overseas partners seems to have changed.
In the past decade-plus, African mineral resource countries mostly stayed in ore mining, initial classification, warehousing, and logistics links, only earning basic labor and resource mining revenue; China undertook mineral deep processing, covering downstream links such as smelting, cathode materials, and battery manufacturing.
After China's new energy industry chain became increasingly mature, African resource countries were no longer satisfied with simply exporting low-value-added primary raw ores. Countries drew lessons from Indonesia's governance of the nickel industry chain, recognized China's import dependency on their mineral resources, successively tightened raw mineral export controls and set quota thresholds, mandated foreign capital to implement deep processing factories locally, and incorporate local capital participation, forcing industry chain value-added revenue to remain in the local jurisdiction.

The bilateral mutual-benefit cooperation pattern maintained for over a decade has been broken. African resource countries attempt to reshape the distribution of industry chain interests from the upstream resource end; this move is no different from a major blow to China's new energy supply chain.
Car Manufacturer Profit Pressures Mount
Currently, profits in the domestic complete vehicle industry are extremely thin. Data from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers shows that the average net profit margin of complete vehicle manufacturing in the first half of 2026 was only 1.5%, reaching a ten-year low.
For a vehicle with an average price of 200,000 yuan, the car manufacturer's average net profit was only 3,000 yuan, far below the average profitability level of large-scale industrial enterprises in the country. Continuous price wars for several years have compressed pricing space, leaving the industry little room to buffer cost fluctuations.
The earnings forecasts released in the second quarter of 2026 directly revealed cost pressures. Seres expects a net loss attributable to the parent company of 1.5 billion to 1.8 billion yuan in the first half of the year, while Beijing Automotive Group Blue Valley expects a net profit loss attributable to the parent company of 1.77 billion to 1.97 billion yuan in the first half of the year. Terminal market competition is fiercely intensified, car manufacturers dare not easily raise selling prices, and new costs brought by raw material price increases must be absorbed internally by the enterprise.
The rise in lithium carbonate prices is one reason for the pressure on car manufacturer profits. Battery-grade lithium carbonate has been rising from 70,000 to 100,000 yuan/ton at the end of 2025, reaching close to 200,000 yuan/ton in May 2026, with prices nearly doubling.
The industry standard calculation is that for every 10,000 yuan/ton increase in lithium carbonate, the battery cost of a pure electric vehicle with 60 kWh increases by 300 yuan; the cost increase per vehicle for long-range models can reach 400 yuan. Compared to the early year low, the rigid cost increase for large-capacity pure electric vehicles is 2,000 to 3,000 yuan, and ternary lithium battery models are burdened even heavier with the added cobalt price fluctuations.

If various African countries continue to ramp up export restrictions, and lithium and cobalt raw material prices remain at high levels, the car manufacturer's situation will further deteriorate. Weak manufacturers with insufficient capacity utilization will continue to amplify loss pressure.
Facing the hazards upstream, China's industry chain did not choose to sit idle.
On one hand, leading mining companies and car manufacturers complied with African localization requirements and implemented smelting capacity locally. Huayou Cobalt laid out lithium sulfate production lines in Zimbabwe, processing minerals locally to meet local policy requirements; China Molybdenum expanded local cobalt smelting capacity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to avoid raw mineral export quota constraints. This kind of heavy asset investment cycle is long.
On the other hand, the sourcing layout moves towards diversification, with some companies accelerating the development of Australian and South American lithium mine resources, simultaneously exploring the potential of lithium resources in domestic Qinghai and Western Sichuan, creating a "double insurance" of "overseas multi-point supply + domestic owned minerals". BYD, CATL, Geely, and other companies broadened overseas mineral cooperation to disperse geopolitical policy risks.
In addition, reducing dependence on rare metals through technology iteration has also become an industry R&D trend. Low-cobalt and cobalt-free solutions continue to be popularized, and mid-range models are equipped with Lithium Iron Phosphate (LFP) batteries on a large scale, reducing the demand for Democratic Republic of the Congo cobalt mines. At the same time, the battery recycling system continues to improve, refining and regenerating lithium and cobalt from retired batteries, gradually forming urban mines, alleviating pressure from importing raw minerals overseas.

Multiple African countries tightening mineral exports aims to redistribute the interests of the new energy industry chain. The domestic industry chain wants to resist external resource fluctuations, cannot rely on low-price imported minerals for the long term, and must continuously advance supply chain diversification and material technology iteration to gradually get rid of constraints from overseas resources. [Copyright Notice] This article is an original work of "Auto People", copyright belongs to the publisher, unauthorized reproduction or partial copying is prohibited, violators will be held liable.
